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hekate/bootloader/hos/hos.c
CTCaer 53325617bb hos: Small refactoring
2020-06-14 01:27:08 +03:00

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/*
* Copyright (c) 2018 naehrwert
* Copyright (c) 2018 st4rk
* Copyright (c) 2018 Ced2911
* Copyright (c) 2018-2020 CTCaer
* Copyright (c) 2018 balika011
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
* version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
* more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <string.h>
#include "hos.h"
#include "hos_config.h"
#include "sept.h"
#include "secmon_exo.h"
#include "../config/config.h"
#include "../gfx/di.h"
#include "../mem/heap.h"
#include "../mem/mc.h"
#include "../mem/minerva.h"
#include "../sec/se.h"
#include "../sec/se_t210.h"
#include "../sec/tsec.h"
#include "../soc/bpmp.h"
#include "../soc/ccplex.h"
#include "../soc/fuse.h"
#include "../soc/pmc.h"
#include "../soc/smmu.h"
#include "../soc/t210.h"
#include "../storage/emummc.h"
#include "../storage/mbr_gpt.h"
#include "../storage/nx_emmc.h"
#include "../storage/nx_sd.h"
#include "../storage/sdmmc.h"
#include "../utils/util.h"
#include "../gfx/gfx.h"
extern hekate_config h_cfg;
//#define DPRINTF(...) gfx_printf(__VA_ARGS__)
#define DPRINTF(...)
#define EHPRINTFARGS(text, args...) \
({ gfx_con.mute = false; \
gfx_printf("%k"text"%k\n", 0xFFFF0000, args, 0xFFCCCCCC); })
#define PKG2_LOAD_ADDR 0xA9800000
// Secmon mailbox.
#define SECMON_MAILBOX_ADDR 0x40002EF8
#define SECMON7_MAILBOX_ADDR 0x400000F8
typedef struct _secmon_mailbox_t
{
// < 4.0.0 Signals - 0: Not ready, 1: BCT ready, 2: DRAM and pkg2 ready, 3: Continue boot.
// >= 4.0.0 Signals - 0: Not ready, 1: BCT ready, 2: DRAM ready, 4: pkg2 ready and continue boot.
u32 in;
// Non-zero: Secmon ready.
u32 out;
} secmon_mailbox_t;
static const u8 keyblob_keyseeds[][0x10] = {
{ 0xDF, 0x20, 0x6F, 0x59, 0x44, 0x54, 0xEF, 0xDC, 0x70, 0x74, 0x48, 0x3B, 0x0D, 0xED, 0x9F, 0xD3 }, // 1.0.0.
{ 0x0C, 0x25, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x68, 0x4C, 0xEB, 0x42, 0x1C, 0x23, 0x79, 0xEA, 0x82, 0x25, 0x12, 0xAC }, // 3.0.0.
{ 0x33, 0x76, 0x85, 0xEE, 0x88, 0x4A, 0xAE, 0x0A, 0xC2, 0x8A, 0xFD, 0x7D, 0x63, 0xC0, 0x43, 0x3B }, // 3.0.1.
{ 0x2D, 0x1F, 0x48, 0x80, 0xED, 0xEC, 0xED, 0x3E, 0x3C, 0xF2, 0x48, 0xB5, 0x65, 0x7D, 0xF7, 0xBE }, // 4.0.0.
{ 0xBB, 0x5A, 0x01, 0xF9, 0x88, 0xAF, 0xF5, 0xFC, 0x6C, 0xFF, 0x07, 0x9E, 0x13, 0x3C, 0x39, 0x80 }, // 5.0.0.
{ 0xD8, 0xCC, 0xE1, 0x26, 0x6A, 0x35, 0x3F, 0xCC, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x2D, 0x3B, 0x51, 0x7D, 0xE9, 0xC0 } // 6.0.0.
};
static const u8 cmac_keyseed[0x10] =
{ 0x59, 0xC7, 0xFB, 0x6F, 0xBE, 0x9B, 0xBE, 0x87, 0x65, 0x6B, 0x15, 0xC0, 0x53, 0x73, 0x36, 0xA5 };
static const u8 master_keyseed_retail[0x10] =
{ 0xD8, 0xA2, 0x41, 0x0A, 0xC6, 0xC5, 0x90, 0x01, 0xC6, 0x1D, 0x6A, 0x26, 0x7C, 0x51, 0x3F, 0x3C };
static const u8 console_keyseed[0x10] =
{ 0x4F, 0x02, 0x5F, 0x0E, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xDC, 0x32, 0x7D, 0x41, 0x86, 0xC2, 0xF4, 0x78 };
const u8 package2_keyseed[0x10] =
{ 0xFB, 0x8B, 0x6A, 0x9C, 0x79, 0x00, 0xC8, 0x49, 0xEF, 0xD2, 0x4D, 0x85, 0x4D, 0x30, 0xA0, 0xC7 };
static const u8 master_keyseed_4xx_5xx_610[0x10] =
{ 0x2D, 0xC1, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0xF3, 0x5B, 0x69, 0x33, 0x42, 0x10, 0xAC, 0x65, 0xDA, 0x90, 0x46, 0x66 };
static const u8 master_keyseed_620[0x10] =
{ 0x37, 0x4B, 0x77, 0x29, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x04, 0x30, 0x81, 0xF6, 0xE5, 0x8C, 0x6D, 0x36, 0x17, 0x9A };
static const u8 console_keyseed_4xx_5xx[0x10] =
{ 0x0C, 0x91, 0x09, 0xDB, 0x93, 0x93, 0x07, 0x81, 0x07, 0x3C, 0xC4, 0x16, 0x22, 0x7C, 0x6C, 0x28 };
static void _hos_crit_error(const char *text)
{
gfx_con.mute = false;
gfx_printf("%k%s%k\n", 0xFFFF0000, text, 0xFFCCCCCC);
}
static void _se_lock(bool lock_se)
{
if (lock_se)
{
for (u32 i = 0; i < 16; i++)
se_key_acc_ctrl(i, SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_KEYREAD_FLAG | SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_OIVREAD_FLAG | SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_UIVREAD_FLAG);
for (u32 i = 0; i < 2; i++)
se_rsa_acc_ctrl(i, SE_RSA_KEY_TBL_DIS_KEYREAD_FLAG);
SE(SE_TZRAM_SECURITY_0) = 0; // Make SE TZRAM secure only.
SE(SE_KEY_TABLE_ACCESS_LOCK_OFFSET) = 0; // Make all key access regs secure only.
SE(SE_RSA_KEYTABLE_ACCESS_LOCK_OFFSET) = 0; // Make all RSA access regs secure only.
SE(SE_SECURITY_0) &= 0xFFFFFFFB; // Make access lock regs secure only.
}
memset((void *)IPATCH_BASE, 0, 14 * sizeof(u32));
SB(SB_CSR) = SB_CSR_PIROM_DISABLE;
// This is useful for documenting the bits in the SE config registers, so we can keep it around.
/*gfx_printf("SE(SE_SECURITY_0) = %08X\n", SE(SE_SECURITY_0));
gfx_printf("SE(0x4) = %08X\n", SE(0x4));
gfx_printf("SE(SE_KEY_TABLE_ACCESS_LOCK_OFFSET) = %08X\n", SE(SE_KEY_TABLE_ACCESS_LOCK_OFFSET));
gfx_printf("SE(SE_RSA_KEYTABLE_ACCESS_LOCK_OFFSET) = %08X\n", SE(SE_RSA_KEYTABLE_ACCESS_LOCK_OFFSET));
for(u32 i = 0; i < 16; i++)
gfx_printf("%02X ", SE(SE_KEY_TABLE_ACCESS_REG_OFFSET + i * 4) & 0xFF);
gfx_putc('\n');
for(u32 i = 0; i < 2; i++)
gfx_printf("%02X ", SE(SE_RSA_KEYTABLE_ACCESS_REG_OFFSET + i * 4) & 0xFF);
gfx_putc('\n');
gfx_hexdump(SE_BASE, (void *)SE_BASE, 0x400);*/
}
void _pmc_scratch_lock(u32 kb)
{
switch (kb)
{
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_100_200:
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_300:
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_301:
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SEC_DISABLE) = 0x7FFFF3;
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SEC_DISABLE2) = 0xFFFFFFFF;
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SEC_DISABLE3) = 0xFFAFFFFF;
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SEC_DISABLE4) = 0xFFFFFFFF;
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SEC_DISABLE5) = 0xFFFFFFFF;
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SEC_DISABLE6) = 0xFFFFFFFF;
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SEC_DISABLE7) = 0xFFFFFFFF;
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SEC_DISABLE8) = 0xFFAAFFFF;
break;
default:
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SEC_DISABLE2) |= 0x3FCFFFF;
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SEC_DISABLE4) |= 0x3F3FFFFF;
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SEC_DISABLE5) = 0xFFFFFFFF;
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SEC_DISABLE6) |= 0xF3FFC00F;
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SEC_DISABLE7) |= 0x3FFFFF;
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SEC_DISABLE8) |= 0xFF;
break;
}
}
void _sysctr0_reset()
{
SYSCTR0(SYSCTR0_CNTCR) = 0;
SYSCTR0(SYSCTR0_COUNTERID0) = 0;
SYSCTR0(SYSCTR0_COUNTERID1) = 0;
SYSCTR0(SYSCTR0_COUNTERID2) = 0;
SYSCTR0(SYSCTR0_COUNTERID3) = 0;
SYSCTR0(SYSCTR0_COUNTERID4) = 0;
SYSCTR0(SYSCTR0_COUNTERID5) = 0;
SYSCTR0(SYSCTR0_COUNTERID6) = 0;
SYSCTR0(SYSCTR0_COUNTERID7) = 0;
SYSCTR0(SYSCTR0_COUNTERID8) = 0;
SYSCTR0(SYSCTR0_COUNTERID9) = 0;
SYSCTR0(SYSCTR0_COUNTERID10) = 0;
SYSCTR0(SYSCTR0_COUNTERID11) = 0;
}
bool hos_eks_rw_try(u8 *buf, bool write)
{
mbr_t *mbr = (mbr_t *)buf;
for (u32 i = 0; i < 3; i++)
{
if (!write)
{
if (sdmmc_storage_read(&sd_storage, 0, 1, mbr))
{
if (mbr->partitions[0].status != 0xFF &&
mbr->partitions[0].start_sct &&
mbr->partitions[0].size_sct)
return true;
else
return false;
}
}
else
{
if (sdmmc_storage_write(&sd_storage, 0, 1, mbr))
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
void hos_eks_get()
{
// Check if EKS already found and parsed.
if (!h_cfg.eks)
{
// Read EKS blob.
u8 *mbr = calloc(512 , 1);
if (!hos_eks_rw_try(mbr, false))
goto out;
// Decrypt EKS blob.
hos_eks_mbr_t *eks = (hos_eks_mbr_t *)(mbr + 0x10);
se_aes_crypt_ecb(14, 0, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t), eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
// Check if valid and for this unit.
if (eks->enabled &&
eks->magic == HOS_EKS_MAGIC &&
eks->magic2 == HOS_EKS_MAGIC &&
eks->sbk_low[0] == FUSE(FUSE_PRIVATE_KEY0) &&
eks->sbk_low[1] == FUSE(FUSE_PRIVATE_KEY1))
{
h_cfg.eks = eks;
return;
}
out:
free(mbr);
}
}
void hos_eks_save(u32 kb)
{
if (kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700)
{
// Only 6 Master keys for now.
u8 key_idx = kb - KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700;
if (key_idx > 5)
return;
bool new_eks = false;
if (!h_cfg.eks)
{
h_cfg.eks = calloc(512 , 1);
new_eks = true;
}
// If matching blob doesn't exist, create it.
if (!(h_cfg.eks->enabled & (1 << key_idx)))
{
// Read EKS blob.
u8 *mbr = calloc(512 , 1);
if (!hos_eks_rw_try(mbr, false))
{
if (new_eks)
{
free(h_cfg.eks);
h_cfg.eks = NULL;
}
goto out;
}
// Get keys.
u8 *keys = (u8 *)calloc(0x1000, 1);
se_get_aes_keys(keys + 0x800, keys, 0x10);
// Set magic and personalized info.
h_cfg.eks->magic = HOS_EKS_MAGIC;
h_cfg.eks->magic2 = HOS_EKS_MAGIC;
h_cfg.eks->enabled |= 1 << key_idx;
h_cfg.eks->sbk_low[0] = FUSE(FUSE_PRIVATE_KEY0);
h_cfg.eks->sbk_low[1] = FUSE(FUSE_PRIVATE_KEY1);
// Copy new keys.
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->keys[key_idx].dkg, keys + 10 * 0x10, 0x10);
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->keys[key_idx].mkk, keys + 12 * 0x10, 0x10);
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->keys[key_idx].fdk, keys + 13 * 0x10, 0x10);
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->keys[key_idx].dkk, keys + 15 * 0x10, 0x10);
// Encrypt EKS blob.
u8 *eks = calloc(512 , 1);
memcpy(eks, h_cfg.eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
se_aes_crypt_ecb(14, 1, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t), eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
// Write EKS blob to SD.
memset(mbr, 0, 0x10);
memcpy(mbr + 0x10, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
hos_eks_rw_try(mbr, true);
free(eks);
free(keys);
out:
free(mbr);
}
}
}
void hos_eks_clear(u32 kb)
{
if (h_cfg.eks && kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700)
{
// Check if Current Master key is enabled.
u8 key_idx = kb - KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700;
if (h_cfg.eks->enabled & (1 << key_idx))
{
// Read EKS blob.
u8 *mbr = calloc(512 , 1);
if (!hos_eks_rw_try(mbr, false))
goto out;
// Disable current Master key version.
h_cfg.eks->enabled &= ~(1 << key_idx);
// Encrypt EKS blob.
u8 *eks = calloc(512 , 1);
memcpy(eks, h_cfg.eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
se_aes_crypt_ecb(14, 1, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t), eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
// Write EKS blob to SD.
memcpy(mbr + 0x10, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
hos_eks_rw_try(mbr, true);
free(eks);
out:
free(mbr);
}
}
}
int hos_keygen(u8 *keyblob, u32 kb, tsec_ctxt_t *tsec_ctxt, launch_ctxt_t *hos_ctxt)
{
u8 tmp[0x20];
u32 retries = 0;
if (kb > KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAX)
return 0;
if (kb <= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_600)
tsec_ctxt->size = 0xF00;
else if (kb == KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_620)
tsec_ctxt->size = 0x2900;
else if (kb == KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700)
tsec_ctxt->size = 0x3000;
else
tsec_ctxt->size = 0x3300;
// Prepare smmu tsec page for 6.2.0.
if (kb == KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_620)
{
u8 *tsec_paged = (u8 *)page_alloc(3);
memcpy(tsec_paged, (void *)tsec_ctxt->fw, tsec_ctxt->size);
tsec_ctxt->fw = tsec_paged;
}
// Get TSEC key.
if (kb <= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_620)
{
while (tsec_query(tmp, kb, tsec_ctxt) < 0)
{
memset(tmp, 0x00, 0x20);
retries++;
// We rely on racing conditions, make sure we cover even the unluckiest cases.
if (retries > 15)
{
_hos_crit_error("\nFailed to get TSEC keys. Please try again.");
return 0;
}
}
}
if (kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700)
{
// Use HOS EKS if it exists.
u8 key_idx = kb - KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700;
if (h_cfg.eks && (h_cfg.eks->enabled & (1 << key_idx)))
{
// Set Device keygen key to slot 10.
se_aes_key_set(10, h_cfg.eks->keys[key_idx].dkg, 0x10);
// Set Master key to slot 12.
se_aes_key_set(12, h_cfg.eks->keys[key_idx].mkk, 0x10);
// Set FW Device key key to slot 13.
se_aes_key_set(13, h_cfg.eks->keys[key_idx].fdk, 0x10);
// Set Device key to slot 15.
se_aes_key_set(15, h_cfg.eks->keys[key_idx].dkk, 0x10);
// Lock FDK.
se_key_acc_ctrl(13, SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_KEYREAD_FLAG | SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_OIVREAD_FLAG | SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_UIVREAD_FLAG);
}
se_aes_key_clear(8);
se_aes_unwrap_key(8, 12, package2_keyseed);
}
else if (kb == KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_620)
{
// Set TSEC key.
se_aes_key_set(12, tmp, 0x10);
// Set TSEC root key.
se_aes_key_set(13, tmp + 0x10, 0x10);
if (!(emu_cfg.enabled && !h_cfg.emummc_force_disable) && hos_ctxt->stock)
{
// Package2 key.
se_aes_key_set(8, tmp + 0x10, 0x10);
se_aes_unwrap_key(8, 8, master_keyseed_620);
se_aes_unwrap_key(8, 8, master_keyseed_retail);
se_aes_unwrap_key(8, 8, package2_keyseed);
}
else
{
// Decrypt keyblob and set keyslots
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(12, 0, tmp + 0x20, keyblob_keyseeds[0]);
se_aes_unwrap_key(15, 14, tmp + 0x20);
se_aes_unwrap_key(14, 15, console_keyseed_4xx_5xx);
se_aes_unwrap_key(15, 15, console_keyseed);
se_aes_unwrap_key(13, 13, master_keyseed_620);
se_aes_unwrap_key(12, 13, master_keyseed_retail);
se_aes_unwrap_key(10, 13, master_keyseed_4xx_5xx_610);
// Package2 key.
se_aes_unwrap_key(8, 12, package2_keyseed);
h_cfg.se_keygen_done = 1;
}
}
else
{
se_key_acc_ctrl(13, SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_KEYREAD_FLAG | SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_OIVREAD_FLAG | SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_UIVREAD_FLAG);
se_key_acc_ctrl(14, SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_KEYREAD_FLAG | SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_OIVREAD_FLAG | SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_UIVREAD_FLAG);
// Set TSEC key.
se_aes_key_set(13, tmp, 0x10);
// Derive keyblob keys from TSEC+SBK.
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(13, 0, tmp, keyblob_keyseeds[0]);
se_aes_unwrap_key(15, 14, tmp);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(13, 0, tmp, keyblob_keyseeds[kb]);
se_aes_unwrap_key(13, 14, tmp);
// Clear SBK.
se_aes_key_clear(14);
//TODO: verify keyblob CMAC.
//se_aes_unwrap_key(11, 13, cmac_keyseed);
//se_aes_cmac(tmp, 0x10, 11, keyblob + 0x10, 0xA0);
//if (!memcmp(keyblob, tmp, 0x10))
// return 0;
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(13, 0, tmp, cmac_keyseed);
se_aes_unwrap_key(11, 13, cmac_keyseed);
// Decrypt keyblob and set keyslots.
se_aes_crypt_ctr(13, keyblob + 0x20, 0x90, keyblob + 0x20, 0x90, keyblob + 0x10);
se_aes_key_set(11, keyblob + 0x20 + 0x80, 0x10); // Package1 key.
se_aes_key_set(12, keyblob + 0x20, 0x10);
se_aes_key_set(13, keyblob + 0x20, 0x10);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(12, 0, tmp, master_keyseed_retail);
switch (kb)
{
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_100_200:
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_300:
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_301:
se_aes_unwrap_key(13, 15, console_keyseed);
se_aes_unwrap_key(12, 12, master_keyseed_retail);
break;
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_400:
se_aes_unwrap_key(13, 15, console_keyseed_4xx_5xx);
se_aes_unwrap_key(15, 15, console_keyseed);
se_aes_unwrap_key(14, 12, master_keyseed_4xx_5xx_610);
se_aes_unwrap_key(12, 12, master_keyseed_retail);
break;
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_500:
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_600:
se_aes_unwrap_key(10, 15, console_keyseed_4xx_5xx);
se_aes_unwrap_key(15, 15, console_keyseed);
se_aes_unwrap_key(14, 12, master_keyseed_4xx_5xx_610);
se_aes_unwrap_key(12, 12, master_keyseed_retail);
break;
}
// Package2 key.
se_key_acc_ctrl(8, SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_KEYREAD_FLAG | SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_OIVREAD_FLAG | SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_UIVREAD_FLAG);
se_aes_unwrap_key(8, 12, package2_keyseed);
}
return 1;
}
static int _read_emmc_pkg1(launch_ctxt_t *ctxt)
{
sdmmc_storage_t storage;
sdmmc_t sdmmc;
int res = emummc_storage_init_mmc(&storage, &sdmmc);
if (res)
{
if (res == 2)
_hos_crit_error("Failed to init eMMC");
else
_hos_crit_error("Failed to init emuMMC");
return 0;
}
// Read package1.
ctxt->pkg1 = (void *)malloc(0x40000);
emummc_storage_set_mmc_partition(&storage, EMMC_BOOT0);
emummc_storage_read(&storage, 0x100000 / NX_EMMC_BLOCKSIZE, 0x40000 / NX_EMMC_BLOCKSIZE, ctxt->pkg1);
ctxt->pkg1_id = pkg1_identify(ctxt->pkg1);
if (!ctxt->pkg1_id)
{
_hos_crit_error("Unknown pkg1 version.");
EHPRINTFARGS("HOS version not supported!%s",
(emu_cfg.enabled && !h_cfg.emummc_force_disable) ? "\nOr emuMMC corrupt!" : "");
goto out;
}
gfx_printf("Identified pkg1 and Keyblob %d\n\n", ctxt->pkg1_id->kb);
// Read the correct keyblob.
ctxt->keyblob = (u8 *)calloc(NX_EMMC_BLOCKSIZE, 1);
emummc_storage_read(&storage, 0x180000 / NX_EMMC_BLOCKSIZE + ctxt->pkg1_id->kb, 1, ctxt->keyblob);
res = 1;
out:
sdmmc_storage_end(&storage);
return res;
}
static u8 *_read_emmc_pkg2(launch_ctxt_t *ctxt)
{
u8 *bctBuf = NULL;
sdmmc_storage_t storage;
sdmmc_t sdmmc;
int res = emummc_storage_init_mmc(&storage, &sdmmc);
if (res)
{
if (res == 2)
_hos_crit_error("Failed to init eMMC");
else
_hos_crit_error("Failed to init emuMMC");
return NULL;
}
emummc_storage_set_mmc_partition(&storage, EMMC_GPP);
// Parse eMMC GPT.
LIST_INIT(gpt);
nx_emmc_gpt_parse(&gpt, &storage);
DPRINTF("Parsed GPT\n");
// Find package2 partition.
emmc_part_t *pkg2_part = nx_emmc_part_find(&gpt, "BCPKG2-1-Normal-Main");
if (!pkg2_part)
goto out;
// Read in package2 header and get package2 real size.
static const u32 BCT_SIZE = 0x4000;
bctBuf = (u8 *)malloc(BCT_SIZE);
nx_emmc_part_read(&storage, pkg2_part, BCT_SIZE / NX_EMMC_BLOCKSIZE, 1, bctBuf);
u32 *hdr = (u32 *)(bctBuf + 0x100);
u32 pkg2_size = hdr[0] ^ hdr[2] ^ hdr[3];
DPRINTF("pkg2 size on emmc is %08X\n", pkg2_size);
// Read in Boot Config.
memset(bctBuf, 0, BCT_SIZE);
nx_emmc_part_read(&storage, pkg2_part, 0, BCT_SIZE / NX_EMMC_BLOCKSIZE, bctBuf);
// Read in package2.
u32 pkg2_size_aligned = ALIGN(pkg2_size, NX_EMMC_BLOCKSIZE);
DPRINTF("pkg2 size aligned is %08X\n", pkg2_size_aligned);
ctxt->pkg2 = malloc(pkg2_size_aligned);
ctxt->pkg2_size = pkg2_size;
nx_emmc_part_read(&storage, pkg2_part, BCT_SIZE / NX_EMMC_BLOCKSIZE,
pkg2_size_aligned / NX_EMMC_BLOCKSIZE, ctxt->pkg2);
out:
nx_emmc_gpt_free(&gpt);
sdmmc_storage_end(&storage);
return bctBuf;
}
static void _free_launch_components(launch_ctxt_t *ctxt)
{
free(ctxt->keyblob);
free(ctxt->pkg1);
free(ctxt->pkg2);
free(ctxt->warmboot);
free(ctxt->secmon);
free(ctxt->kernel);
free(ctxt->kip1_patches);
}
static bool _get_fs_exfat_compatible(link_t *info)
{
u32 fs_idx;
u32 fs_ids_cnt;
u32 sha_buf[32 / sizeof(u32)];
kip1_id_t *kip_ids;
LIST_FOREACH_ENTRY(pkg2_kip1_info_t, ki, info, link)
{
if (strncmp((const char*)ki->kip1->name, "FS", 2))
continue;
if (!se_calc_sha256_oneshot(sha_buf, ki->kip1, ki->size))
break;
pkg2_get_ids(&kip_ids, &fs_ids_cnt);
for (fs_idx = 0; fs_idx < fs_ids_cnt; fs_idx++)
if (!memcmp(sha_buf, kip_ids[fs_idx].hash, 8))
break;
// Return false if FAT32 only.
if (fs_ids_cnt <= fs_idx && !(fs_idx & 1))
return false;
break;
}
return true;
}
int hos_launch(ini_sec_t *cfg)
{
u8 kb;
launch_ctxt_t ctxt;
tsec_ctxt_t tsec_ctxt;
volatile secmon_mailbox_t *secmon_mailbox;
minerva_change_freq(FREQ_1600);
memset(&ctxt, 0, sizeof(launch_ctxt_t));
memset(&tsec_ctxt, 0, sizeof(tsec_ctxt_t));
list_init(&ctxt.kip1_list);
ctxt.cfg = cfg;
if (!gfx_con.mute)
gfx_clear_grey(0x1B);
gfx_con_setpos(0, 0);
gfx_puts("Initializing...\n\n");
// Read package1 and the correct keyblob.
if (!_read_emmc_pkg1(&ctxt))
return 0;
// Try to parse config if present.
if (ctxt.cfg && !parse_boot_config(&ctxt))
{
_hos_crit_error("Wrong ini cfg or missing files!");
return 0;
}
// Enable emummc patching.
if (emu_cfg.enabled && !h_cfg.emummc_force_disable)
{
if (ctxt.stock)
{
_hos_crit_error("Stock emuMMC is not supported yet!");
return 0;
}
ctxt.atmosphere = true; // Set atmosphere patching in case of Stock emuMMC and no fss0.
config_kip1patch(&ctxt, "emummc");
}
else if (!emu_cfg.enabled && ctxt.emummc_forced)
{
_hos_crit_error("emuMMC is forced but not enabled!");
return 0;
}
// Check if fuses lower than 4.0.0 or 9.0.0 and if yes apply NO Gamecard patch.
// Additionally check if running emuMMC and disable GC if v3 fuses are burnt and HOS is <= 8.1.0.
if (!ctxt.stock)
{
u32 fuses = fuse_read_odm(7);
if ((h_cfg.autonogc &&
((!(fuses & ~0xF) && (kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_400)) || // LAFW v2.
(!(fuses & ~0x3FF) && (kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_900)))) // LAFW v3.
|| ((emu_cfg.enabled && !h_cfg.emummc_force_disable) &&
((fuses & 0x400) && (kb <= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_810))))
config_kip1patch(&ctxt, "nogc");
}
gfx_puts("Loaded config, pkg1 and keyblob\n");
// Generate keys.
if (!h_cfg.se_keygen_done)
{
tsec_ctxt.fw = (u8 *)ctxt.pkg1 + ctxt.pkg1_id->tsec_off;
tsec_ctxt.pkg1 = ctxt.pkg1;
tsec_ctxt.pkg11_off = ctxt.pkg1_id->pkg11_off;
tsec_ctxt.secmon_base = ctxt.pkg1_id->secmon_base;
if (kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700 && !h_cfg.sept_run)
{
_hos_crit_error("Failed to run sept");
return 0;
}
if (!hos_keygen(ctxt.keyblob, kb, &tsec_ctxt, &ctxt))
return 0;
gfx_puts("Generated keys\n");
if (kb <= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_600)
h_cfg.se_keygen_done = 1;
}
// Decrypt and unpack package1 if we require parts of it.
if (!ctxt.warmboot || !ctxt.secmon)
{
if (kb <= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_600)
pkg1_decrypt(ctxt.pkg1_id, ctxt.pkg1);
if (kb <= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_620 && !(emu_cfg.enabled && !h_cfg.emummc_force_disable))
{
pkg1_unpack((void *)ctxt.pkg1_id->warmboot_base, (void *)ctxt.pkg1_id->secmon_base, NULL, ctxt.pkg1_id, ctxt.pkg1);
gfx_puts("Decrypted & unpacked pkg1\n");
}
else
{
_hos_crit_error("No mandatory secmon or warmboot provided!");
return 0;
}
}
// Replace 'warmboot.bin' if requested.
if (ctxt.warmboot)
memcpy((void *)ctxt.pkg1_id->warmboot_base, ctxt.warmboot, ctxt.warmboot_size);
else
{
if (kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700)
{
_hos_crit_error("No warmboot provided!");
return 0;
}
// Else we patch it to allow downgrading.
patch_t *warmboot_patchset = ctxt.pkg1_id->warmboot_patchset;
gfx_printf("%kPatching Warmboot%k\n", 0xFFFFBA00, 0xFFCCCCCC);
for (u32 i = 0; warmboot_patchset[i].off != 0xFFFFFFFF; i++)
*(vu32 *)(ctxt.pkg1_id->warmboot_base + warmboot_patchset[i].off) = warmboot_patchset[i].val;
}
// Set warmboot address in PMC if required.
if (ctxt.pkg1_id->set_warmboot)
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SCRATCH1) = ctxt.pkg1_id->warmboot_base;
// Replace 'SecureMonitor' if requested.
if (ctxt.secmon)
memcpy((void *)ctxt.pkg1_id->secmon_base, ctxt.secmon, ctxt.secmon_size);
else if (ctxt.pkg1_id->secmon_patchset)
{
// Else we patch it to allow for an unsigned package2 and patched kernel.
patch_t *secmon_patchset = ctxt.pkg1_id->secmon_patchset;
gfx_printf("%kPatching Secure Monitor%k\n", 0xFFFFBA00, 0xFFCCCCCC);
for (u32 i = 0; secmon_patchset[i].off != 0xFFFFFFFF; i++)
*(vu32 *)(ctxt.pkg1_id->secmon_base + secmon_patchset[i].off) = secmon_patchset[i].val;
}
gfx_puts("Loaded warmboot and secmon\n");
// Read package2.
u8 *bootConfigBuf = _read_emmc_pkg2(&ctxt);
if (!bootConfigBuf)
{
_hos_crit_error("Pkg2 read failed!");
return 0;
}
gfx_puts("Read pkg2\n");
// Decrypt package2 and parse KIP1 blobs in INI1 section.
pkg2_hdr_t *pkg2_hdr = pkg2_decrypt(ctxt.pkg2, kb);
if (!pkg2_hdr)
{
_hos_crit_error("Pkg2 decryption failed!");
if (kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700)
{
EPRINTF("Is Sept updated?");
// Clear EKS slot, in case something went wrong with sept keygen.
hos_eks_clear(kb);
}
return 0;
}
else if (kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700)
hos_eks_save(kb); // Save EKS slot if it doesn't exist.
LIST_INIT(kip1_info);
if (!pkg2_parse_kips(&kip1_info, pkg2_hdr, &ctxt.new_pkg2))
{
_hos_crit_error("INI1 parsing failed!");
return 0;
}
gfx_puts("Parsed ini1\n");
// Use the kernel included in package2 in case we didn't load one already.
if (!ctxt.kernel)
{
ctxt.kernel = pkg2_hdr->data;
ctxt.kernel_size = pkg2_hdr->sec_size[PKG2_SEC_KERNEL];
if (!ctxt.stock && (ctxt.svcperm || ctxt.debugmode || ctxt.atmosphere))
{
u8 kernel_hash[0x20];
// Hash only Kernel when it embeds INI1.
if (!ctxt.new_pkg2)
se_calc_sha256_oneshot(kernel_hash, ctxt.kernel, ctxt.kernel_size);
else
se_calc_sha256_oneshot(kernel_hash, ctxt.kernel + PKG2_NEWKERN_START,
pkg2_newkern_ini1_start - PKG2_NEWKERN_START);
ctxt.pkg2_kernel_id = pkg2_identify(kernel_hash);
if (!ctxt.pkg2_kernel_id)
{
_hos_crit_error("Failed to identify kernel!");
return 0;
}
// In case a kernel patch option is set; allows to disable SVC verification or/and enable debug mode.
kernel_patch_t *kernel_patchset = ctxt.pkg2_kernel_id->kernel_patchset;
if (kernel_patchset != NULL)
{
gfx_printf("%kPatching kernel%k\n", 0xFFFFBA00, 0xFFCCCCCC);
u32 *temp;
for (u32 i = 0; kernel_patchset[i].id != 0xFFFFFFFF; i++)
{
if ((ctxt.svcperm && kernel_patchset[i].id == SVC_VERIFY_DS)
|| (ctxt.debugmode && kernel_patchset[i].id == DEBUG_MODE_EN && !(ctxt.atmosphere && ctxt.secmon))
|| (ctxt.atmosphere && kernel_patchset[i].id == ATM_GEN_PATCH))
*(vu32 *)(ctxt.kernel + kernel_patchset[i].off) = kernel_patchset[i].val;
else if (ctxt.atmosphere && kernel_patchset[i].id == ATM_ARR_PATCH)
{
temp = (u32 *)kernel_patchset[i].ptr;
for (u32 j = 0; j < kernel_patchset[i].val; j++)
*(vu32 *)(ctxt.kernel + kernel_patchset[i].off + (j << 2)) = temp[j];
}
else if (kernel_patchset[i].id < SVC_VERIFY_DS)
*(vu32 *)(ctxt.kernel + kernel_patchset[i].off) = kernel_patchset[i].val;
}
}
}
}
// Merge extra KIP1s into loaded ones.
gfx_printf("%kPatching kips%k\n", 0xFFFFBA00, 0xFFCCCCCC);
LIST_FOREACH_ENTRY(merge_kip_t, mki, &ctxt.kip1_list, link)
pkg2_merge_kip(&kip1_info, (pkg2_kip1_t *)mki->kip1);
// Check if FS is compatible with exFAT.
if (!ctxt.stock && sd_fs.fs_type == FS_EXFAT && !_get_fs_exfat_compatible(&kip1_info))
{
_hos_crit_error("SD Card is exFAT and the installed\nFS only supports FAT32!");
_free_launch_components(&ctxt);
return 0;
}
// Patch kip1s in memory if needed.
const char* unappliedPatch = pkg2_patch_kips(&kip1_info, ctxt.kip1_patches);
if (unappliedPatch != NULL)
{
EHPRINTFARGS("Failed to apply '%s'!", unappliedPatch);
_free_launch_components(&ctxt);
return 0; // MUST stop here, because if user requests 'nogc' but it's not applied, their GC controller gets updated!
}
// Rebuild and encrypt package2.
pkg2_build_encrypt((void *)PKG2_LOAD_ADDR, ctxt.kernel, ctxt.kernel_size, &kip1_info, ctxt.new_pkg2);
gfx_puts("Rebuilt & loaded pkg2\n");
gfx_printf("\n%kBooting...%k\n", 0xFF96FF00, 0xFFCCCCCC);
// Clear pkg1/pkg2 keys.
se_aes_key_clear(8);
se_aes_key_clear(11);
// Set initial mailbox values.
int bootStateDramPkg2 = 0;
int bootStatePkg2Continue = 0;
// Set warmboot PA address ids for 3.0.0 - 3.0.2.
if (kb == KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_300)
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SECURE_SCRATCH32) = 0xE3; // Warmboot 3.0.0 PA address id.
else if (kb == KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_301)
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SECURE_SCRATCH32) = 0x104; // Warmboot 3.0.1/.2 PA address id.
// Finalize per firmware key access.
switch (ctxt.pkg1_id->kb)
{
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_100_200:
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_300:
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_301:
se_key_acc_ctrl(12, SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_KEY_ACCESS_FLAG | SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_KEY_LOCK_FLAG);
se_key_acc_ctrl(13, SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_KEY_ACCESS_FLAG | SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_KEY_LOCK_FLAG);
bootStateDramPkg2 = 2;
bootStatePkg2Continue = 3;
break;
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_400:
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_500:
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_600:
se_key_acc_ctrl(12, SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_KEY_ACCESS_FLAG | SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_KEY_LOCK_FLAG);
se_key_acc_ctrl(15, SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_KEY_ACCESS_FLAG | SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_KEY_LOCK_FLAG);
default:
bootStateDramPkg2 = 2;
bootStatePkg2Continue = 4;
break;
}
// Clear BCT area for retail units and copy it over if dev unit.
if (kb <= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_500)
{
memset((void *)0x4003D000, 0, 0x3000);
if ((fuse_read_odm(4) & 3) == 3)
memcpy((void *)0x4003D000, bootConfigBuf, 0x1000);
}
else
{
memset((void *)0x4003F000, 0, 0x1000);
if ((fuse_read_odm(4) & 3) == 3)
memcpy((void *)0x4003F800, bootConfigBuf, 0x800);
}
free(bootConfigBuf);
// Config Exosphère if booting full Atmosphère.
if (ctxt.atmosphere && ctxt.secmon)
config_exosphere(&ctxt);
// Unmount SD card.
sd_end();
// Finalize MC carveout.
if (kb <= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_301)
mc_config_carveout();
// Lock SE before starting 'SecureMonitor' if < 6.2.0, otherwise lock bootrom and ipatches.
_se_lock(kb <= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_600);
// Reset sysctr0 counters.
if (kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_620)
_sysctr0_reset();
// < 4.0.0 pkg1.1 locks PMC scratches.
//_pmc_scratch_lock(kb);
// Set secmon mailbox address.
if (kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700)
secmon_mailbox = (secmon_mailbox_t *)SECMON7_MAILBOX_ADDR;
else
secmon_mailbox = (secmon_mailbox_t *)SECMON_MAILBOX_ADDR;
// Start from DRAM ready signal and reset outgoing value.
secmon_mailbox->in = bootStateDramPkg2;
secmon_mailbox->out = 0;
// Disable display. This must be executed before secmon to provide support for all fw versions.
display_end();
// Clear EMC_SCRATCH0.
EMC(EMC_SCRATCH0) = 0;
// Flush cache and disable MMU.
bpmp_mmu_disable();
bpmp_clk_rate_set(BPMP_CLK_NORMAL);
minerva_change_freq(FREQ_1600);
// emuMMC: Some cards (Sandisk U1), do not like a fast power cycle. Wait min 100ms.
sdmmc_storage_init_wait_sd();
// Wait for secmon to get ready.
if (smmu_is_used())
smmu_exit();
else
ccplex_boot_cpu0(ctxt.pkg1_id->secmon_base);
while (!secmon_mailbox->out)
; // A usleep(1) only works when in IRAM or with a trained DRAM.
// Signal pkg2 ready and continue boot.
secmon_mailbox->in = bootStatePkg2Continue;
// Halt ourselves in waitevent state and resume if there's JTAG activity.
while (true)
bpmp_halt();
return 0;
}
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