diff --git a/exosphere/configitem.c b/exosphere/configitem.c
index 8a9cd2d65..ccf9b44d0 100644
--- a/exosphere/configitem.c
+++ b/exosphere/configitem.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ uint32_t configitem_set(enum ConfigItem item, uint64_t value) {
 bool configitem_is_recovery_boot(void) {
     uint64_t is_recovery_boot;
     if (configitem_get(CONFIGITEM_ISRECOVERYBOOT, &is_recovery_boot) != 0) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
 
     return is_recovery_boot != 0;
diff --git a/exosphere/exceptions.s b/exosphere/exceptions.s
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..14ce6e3a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exosphere/exceptions.s
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+/* Some macros taken from https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/include/common/aarch64/asm_macros.S */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+ 
+
+/*
+ * Declare the exception vector table, enforcing it is aligned on a
+ * 2KB boundary, as required by the ARMv8 architecture.
+ * Use zero bytes as the fill value to be stored in the padding bytes
+ * so that it inserts illegal AArch64 instructions. This increases
+ * security, robustness and potentially facilitates debugging.
+ */
+.macro vector_base  label, section_name=.vectors
+.section \section_name, "ax"
+.align 11, 0
+\label:
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * Create an entry in the exception vector table, enforcing it is
+ * aligned on a 128-byte boundary, as required by the ARMv8 architecture.
+ * Use zero bytes as the fill value to be stored in the padding bytes
+ * so that it inserts illegal AArch64 instructions. This increases
+ * security, robustness and potentially facilitates debugging.
+ */
+.macro vector_entry  label, section_name=.vectors
+.cfi_sections .debug_frame
+.section \section_name, "ax"
+.align 7, 0
+.type \label, %function
+.func \label
+.cfi_startproc
+\label:
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * This macro verifies that the given vector doesnt exceed the
+ * architectural limit of 32 instructions. This is meant to be placed
+ * immediately after the last instruction in the vector. It takes the
+ * vector entry as the parameter
+ */
+.macro check_vector_size since
+    .endfunc
+    .cfi_endproc
+    .if (. - \since) > (32 * 4)
+        .error "Vector exceeds 32 instructions"
+    .endif
+.endm
+
+
+
+
+/* Actual Vectors for Exosphere. */
+.global exosphere_vectors
+vector_base exosphere_vectors
+
+/* Current EL, SP0 */
+.global unknown_exception
+unknown_exception:
+vector_entry synch_sp0
+    /* Panic with color FF7700, code 10. */
+    mov x0, #0x10
+    movk x0, #0x07F0,lsl#16
+    b panic
+    check_vector_size synch_sp0
+
+vector_entry irq_sp0
+    b unknown_exception
+    check_vector irq_sp0
+
+vector_entry fiq_sp0
+    b unknown_exception
+    check_vector fiq_sp0
+
+vector_entry serror_sp0
+    b unknown_exception
+    check_vector serror_sp0
+
+/* Current EL, SPx */
+vector_entry synch_spx
+    b unknown_exception
+    check_vector synch_spx
+
+vector_entry irq_spx
+    b unknown_exception
+    check_vector irq_spx
+
+vector_entry fiq_spx
+    b unknown_exception
+    check_vector fiq_spx
+
+vector_entry serror_spx
+    b unknown_exception
+    check_vector serror_spx
+    
+/* Lower EL, A64 */
+vector_entry synch_a64
+    stp x29, x30, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    /* Verify SMC. */
+    mrs x30, esr_el3
+    lsr w29, w30, #0x1A
+    cmp w29, #0x17
+    ldp x29, x30, [sp],#0x10
+    b.ne unknown_exception
+    /* Call appropriate handler. */
+    stp x29, x30, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    mrs x29, mpidr_el1
+    and x29, x39, #0x3
+    cmp x29, #0x3
+    b.ne handle_core012_smc_exception
+    bl handle_core3_smc_exception
+    ldp x29, x30, [sp],#0x10
+    eret
+    check_vector synch_a64
+
+vector_entry irq_a64
+    b unknown_exception
+    check_vector irq_a64
+
+vector_entry fiq_a64
+    stp x29, x30, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    mrs x29, mpidr_el1
+    and x29, x39, #0x3
+    cmp x29, #0x3
+    b.ne unknown_exception
+    stp x28, x29, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x26, x27, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    bl handle_fiq_exception
+    ldp x26, x27, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x28, x29, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x29, x30, [sp],#0x10
+    eret
+    check_vector fiq_a64
+
+vector_entry serror_a64
+    b unknown_exception
+    .endfunc
+    .cfi_endproc
+/* To save space, insert in an unused vector segment. */
+.global     handle_core012_smc_exception
+.type       handle_core012_smc_exception, %function
+handle_core012_smc_exception:
+    stp x6, x7, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x4, x5, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x2, x3, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x0, x1, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    bl set_priv_smc_in_progress
+    bl get_smc_core012_stack_address
+    mov x29, x0
+    ldp x0, x1, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x2, x3, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x4, x5, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x6, x7, [sp],#0x10
+    mov x30, sp
+    mov sp, x29
+    stp x29, x30, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    bl handle_core3_smc_exception
+    ldp x29, x30, [sp],#0x10
+    mov sp, x30
+    stp x6, x7, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x4, x5, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x2, x3, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x0, x1, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    bl clear_priv_smc_in_progress
+    ldp x0, x1, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x2, x3, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x4, x5, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x6, x7, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x29, x30, [sp],#0x10
+    eret
+    .if (. - serror_a64) > (32 * 4)
+        .error "Vector exceeds 32 instructions"
+    .endif
+    
+/* Lower EL, A32 */
+vector_entry synch_a32
+    b unknown_exception
+    check_vector synch_a32
+
+vector_entry irq_a32
+    b unknown_exception
+    check_vector irq_a32
+
+vector_entry fiq_a32
+    b fiq_a64
+    .endfunc
+    .cfi_endproc
+/* To save space, insert in an unused vector segment. */
+.global     handle_fiq_exception
+.type       handle_fiq_exception, %function
+handle_fiq_exception:
+    stp x29, x30, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x24, x25, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x22, x23, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x20, x21, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x18, x19, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x16, x17, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x14, x15, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x12, x13, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x10, x11, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x8, x9, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x6, x7, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x4, x5, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x2, x3, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x0, x1, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    bl handle_registered_interrupt
+    ldp x0, x1, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x2, x3, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x4, x5, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x6, x7, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x8, x9, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x10, x11, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x12, x13, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x14, x15, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x16, x17, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x18, x19, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x20, x21, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x22, x23, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x24, x25, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x29, x30, [sp],#0x10
+    ret
+    .if (. - fiq_a32) > (32 * 4)
+        .error "Vector exceeds 32 instructions"
+    .endif
+
+vector_entry serror_a32
+    b unknown_exception
+    .endfunc
+    .cfi_endproc
+/* To save space, insert in an unused vector segment. */
+.global     handle_core3_smc_exception
+.type       handle_core3_smc_exception, %function
+handle_core3_smc_exception:
+    stp x29, x30, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x18, x19, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x16, x17, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x14, x15, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x12, x13, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x10, x11, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x8, x9, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x6, x7, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x4, x5, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x2, x3, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    stp x0, x1, [sp, #-0x10]!
+    mrs x0, esr_el3
+    and x0, x0, #0xFFFF
+    mov x1, sp
+    bl call_smc_handler
+    ldp x0, x1, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x2, x3, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x4, x5, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x6, x7, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x8, x9, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x10, x11, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x12, x13, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x14, x15, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x16, x17, [sp],#0x10
+    ldp x18, x19, [sp],#0x10
+    ret
+    .if (. - serror_a32) > (32 * 4)
+        .error "Vector exceeds 32 instructions"
+    .endif
diff --git a/exosphere/gcm.c b/exosphere/gcm.c
index 9aa6233f7..211cd8252 100644
--- a/exosphere/gcm.c
+++ b/exosphere/gcm.c
@@ -117,11 +117,11 @@ size_t gcm_decrypt_key(void *dst, size_t dst_size, const void *src, size_t src_s
     if (is_personalized == 0) {
         /* Devkit keys use a different keyformat without a MAC/Device ID. */
         if (src_size <= 0x10 || src_size - 0x10 > dst_size) {
-            panic();
+            generic_panic();
         }
     } else {
         if (src_size <= 0x30 || src_size - 0x20 > dst_size) {
-            panic();
+            generic_panic();
         }
     }
 
diff --git a/exosphere/i2c.c b/exosphere/i2c.c
index b0ef821fd..72565dbf0 100644
--- a/exosphere/i2c.c
+++ b/exosphere/i2c.c
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ volatile i2c_registers_t *i2c_get_registers_from_id(unsigned int id) {
         case 5:
             return I2C6_REGS;
         default:
-            panic();
+            generic_panic();
     }
     return NULL;
 }
diff --git a/exosphere/interrupt.c b/exosphere/interrupt.c
index 1ed4800fd..2bec9849c 100644
--- a/exosphere/interrupt.c
+++ b/exosphere/interrupt.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ void handle_registered_interrupt(void) {
         }
         /* We must have found a handler, or something went wrong. */
         if (!found_handler) {
-            panic();
+            generic_panic();
         }
     }
 }
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ void intr_register_handler(unsigned int id, void (*handler)(void)) {
     }
     /* Failure to register is an error condition. */
     if (!registered_handler) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
 }
 
diff --git a/exosphere/lock.h b/exosphere/lock.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5a4ca4a28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exosphere/lock.h
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+#ifndef EXOSPHERE_LOCK_H
+#define EXOSPHERE_LOCK_H
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+/* Simple atomics driver for Exosphere. */
+
+/* Acquire a lock. */
+static inline void lock_acquire(bool *l) {
+    while (__atomic_test_and_set(l, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE)) {
+        /* Wait to acquire lock. */
+    }
+}
+
+/* Release a lock. */
+static inline void lock_release(bool *l) {
+    __atomic_clear(l, __ATOMIC_RELEASE);
+}
+
+/* Try to acquire a lock. */
+static inline bool lock_try_acquire(bool *l) {
+    return __atomic_test_and_set(l, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE);
+}
+
+#endif
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/exosphere/masterkey.c b/exosphere/masterkey.c
index f1bba7989..5288b9405 100644
--- a/exosphere/masterkey.c
+++ b/exosphere/masterkey.c
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ bool check_mkey_revision(unsigned int revision) {
 
 void mkey_detect_revision(void) {
     if (g_determined_mkey_revision) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     for (unsigned int rev = 0; rev < MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX; rev++) {
@@ -60,13 +60,13 @@ void mkey_detect_revision(void) {
     /* TODO: When panic is implemented, make this a really distinctive color. */
     /* Maybe bright red? */
     if (!g_determined_mkey_revision) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
 }
 
 unsigned int mkey_get_revision(void) {
     if (!g_determined_mkey_revision) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
 
     return g_mkey_revision;
@@ -74,11 +74,11 @@ unsigned int mkey_get_revision(void) {
 
 unsigned int mkey_get_keyslot(unsigned int revision) {
     if (!g_determined_mkey_revision || revision >= MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
 
     if (revision > g_mkey_revision) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
 
     if (revision == g_mkey_revision) {
diff --git a/exosphere/mc.c b/exosphere/mc.c
index 6a1d3b358..1b930a3a1 100644
--- a/exosphere/mc.c
+++ b/exosphere/mc.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ volatile security_carveout_t *get_carveout_by_id(unsigned int carveout) {
     if (CARVEOUT_ID_MIN <= carveout && carveout <= CARVEOUT_ID_MAX) {
          return (volatile security_carveout_t *)(MC_BASE + 0xC08ULL + 0x50 * (carveout - CARVEOUT_ID_MIN));
     }
-    panic();
+    generic_panic();
     return NULL;
     switch (carveout) {
         case 4: /* Kernel carveout */
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ volatile security_carveout_t *get_carveout_by_id(unsigned int carveout) {
         case 5: /* Unused Kernel carveout */
             return (volatile security_carveout_t *)(MC_BASE + 0xD48ULL);
         default:
-            panic();
+            generic_panic();
             return NULL;
     }
 }
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ void configure_default_carveouts(void) {
 
 void configure_kernel_carveout(unsigned int carveout_id, uint64_t address, uint64_t size) {
     if (carveout_id != 4 && carveout_id != 5) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     volatile security_carveout_t *carveout = get_carveout_by_id(carveout_id);
diff --git a/exosphere/package2.c b/exosphere/package2.c
index b2574c64c..c9e2e3779 100644
--- a/exosphere/package2.c
+++ b/exosphere/package2.c
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ void verify_header_signature(package2_header_t *header) {
     
     /* This is normally only allowed on dev units, but we'll allow it anywhere. */
     if (bootconfig_is_package2_unsigned() == 0 && rsa2048_pss_verify(header->signature, 0x100, modulus, 0x100, header->encrypted_header, 0x100) == 0) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
 }
 
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ uint32_t decrypt_and_validate_header(package2_header_t *header) {
         }
             
         /* Ensure we successfully decrypted the header. */
-        panic();  
+        generic_panic();  
     }
     return 0;
 }
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ void load_package2_sections(package2_meta_t *metadata, uint32_t master_key_rev)
             potential_base_end += PACKAGE2_SIZE_MAX;
         }
         if (!found_safe_carveout) {
-            panic();
+            generic_panic();
         }
         /* Relocate to new carveout. */
         memcpy((void *)potential_base_start, load_buf, PACKAGE2_SIZE_MAX);
diff --git a/exosphere/se.c b/exosphere/se.c
index 86e4a928d..49a2a7fbe 100644
--- a/exosphere/se.c
+++ b/exosphere/se.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ security_engine_t *get_security_engine_address(void) {
 
 void set_security_engine_callback(unsigned int (*callback)(void)) {
     if (callback == NULL || g_se_callback != NULL) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     g_se_callback = callback;
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ void se_operation_completed(void) {
 
 void se_check_for_error(void) {
     if (SECURITY_ENGINE->INT_STATUS_REG & 0x10000 || SECURITY_ENGINE->FLAGS_REG & 3 || SECURITY_ENGINE->ERR_STATUS_REG) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
 }
 
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ void se_trigger_intrrupt(void) {
 
 void se_verify_flags_cleared(void) {
     if (SECURITY_ENGINE->FLAGS_REG & 3) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
 }
 
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ void se_clear_interrupts(void) {
 /* Set the flags for an AES keyslot. */
 void set_aes_keyslot_flags(unsigned int keyslot, unsigned int flags) {
     if (keyslot >= KEYSLOT_AES_MAX) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     /* Misc flags. */
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ void set_aes_keyslot_flags(unsigned int keyslot, unsigned int flags) {
 /* Set the flags for an RSA keyslot. */
 void set_rsa_keyslot_flags(unsigned int keyslot, unsigned int flags) {
     if (keyslot >= KEYSLOT_RSA_MAX) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     /* Misc flags. */
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ void set_rsa_keyslot_flags(unsigned int keyslot, unsigned int flags) {
 
 void clear_aes_keyslot(unsigned int keyslot) {
     if (keyslot >= KEYSLOT_AES_MAX) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     /* Zero out the whole keyslot and IV. */
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ void clear_aes_keyslot(unsigned int keyslot) {
 
 void clear_rsa_keyslot(unsigned int keyslot) {
     if (keyslot >= KEYSLOT_RSA_MAX) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     /* Zero out the whole keyslot. */
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ void clear_rsa_keyslot(unsigned int keyslot) {
 
 void set_aes_keyslot(unsigned int keyslot, const void *key, size_t key_size) {
     if (keyslot >= KEYSLOT_AES_MAX || key_size > KEYSIZE_AES_MAX) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     for (size_t i = 0; i < (key_size >> 2); i++) {
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ void set_aes_keyslot(unsigned int keyslot, const void *key, size_t key_size) {
 
 void set_rsa_keyslot(unsigned int keyslot, const void  *modulus, size_t modulus_size, const void *exponent, size_t exp_size) {
     if (keyslot >= KEYSLOT_RSA_MAX || modulus_size > KEYSIZE_RSA_MAX || exp_size > KEYSIZE_RSA_MAX) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     for (size_t i = 0; i < (modulus_size >> 2); i++) {
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ void set_rsa_keyslot(unsigned int keyslot, const void  *modulus, size_t modulus_
 
 void set_aes_keyslot_iv(unsigned int keyslot, const void *iv, size_t iv_size) {
     if (keyslot >= KEYSLOT_AES_MAX || iv_size > 0x10) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     for (size_t i = 0; i < (iv_size >> 2); i++) {
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ void set_aes_keyslot_iv(unsigned int keyslot, const void *iv, size_t iv_size) {
 
 void clear_aes_keyslot_iv(unsigned int keyslot) {
     if (keyslot >= KEYSLOT_AES_MAX) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     for (size_t i = 0; i < (0x10 >> 2); i++) {
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ void set_se_ctr(const void *ctr) {
 
 void decrypt_data_into_keyslot(unsigned int keyslot_dst, unsigned int keyslot_src, const void *wrapped_key, size_t wrapped_key_size) {
     if (keyslot_dst >= KEYSLOT_AES_MAX || keyslot_src >= KEYSIZE_AES_MAX || wrapped_key_size > KEYSIZE_AES_MAX) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     SECURITY_ENGINE->CONFIG_REG = (ALG_AES_DEC | DST_KEYTAB);
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ void decrypt_data_into_keyslot(unsigned int keyslot_dst, unsigned int keyslot_sr
 
 void se_aes_crypt_insecure_internal(unsigned int keyslot, uint32_t out_ll_paddr, uint32_t in_ll_paddr, size_t size, unsigned int crypt_config, bool encrypt, unsigned int (*callback)(void)) {
     if (keyslot >= KEYSLOT_AES_MAX) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     if (size == 0) {
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ void se_exp_mod(unsigned int keyslot, void *buf, size_t size, unsigned int (*cal
     uint8_t stack_buf[KEYSIZE_RSA_MAX];
     
     if (keyslot >= KEYSLOT_RSA_MAX || size > KEYSIZE_RSA_MAX) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     /* Endian swap the input. */
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ void se_synchronous_exp_mod(unsigned int keyslot, void *dst, size_t dst_size, co
     uint8_t stack_buf[KEYSIZE_RSA_MAX];
     
     if (keyslot >= KEYSLOT_RSA_MAX || src_size > KEYSIZE_RSA_MAX || dst_size > KEYSIZE_RSA_MAX) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
 
     /* Endian swap the input. */
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ void se_perform_aes_block_operation(void *dst, size_t dst_size, const void *src,
     uint8_t block[0x10];
 
     if (src_size > sizeof(block) || dst_size > sizeof(block)) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     /* Load src data into block. */
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ void se_perform_aes_block_operation(void *dst, size_t dst_size, const void *src,
 
 void se_aes_ctr_crypt(unsigned int keyslot, void *dst, size_t dst_size, const void *src, size_t src_size, const void *ctr, size_t ctr_size) {
     if (keyslot >= KEYSLOT_AES_MAX || ctr_size != 0x10) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     unsigned int num_blocks = src_size >> 4;
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ void se_aes_ctr_crypt(unsigned int keyslot, void *dst, size_t dst_size, const vo
 
 void se_aes_ecb_encrypt_block(unsigned int keyslot, void *dst, size_t dst_size, const void *src, size_t src_size, unsigned int config_high) {
     if (keyslot >= KEYSLOT_AES_MAX || dst_size != 0x10 || src_size != 0x10) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     /* Set configuration high (256-bit vs 128-bit) based on parameter. */
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ void se_aes_256_ecb_encrypt_block(unsigned int keyslot, void *dst, size_t dst_si
 
 void se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(unsigned int keyslot, void *dst, size_t dst_size, const void *src, size_t src_size) {
     if (keyslot >= KEYSLOT_AES_MAX || dst_size != 0x10 || src_size != 0x10) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     SECURITY_ENGINE->CONFIG_REG = (ALG_AES_DEC | DST_MEMORY);
@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ void shift_left_xor_rb(uint8_t *key) {
 
 void se_compute_aes_cmac(unsigned int keyslot, void *cmac, size_t cmac_size, const void *data, size_t data_size, unsigned int config_high) {
     if (keyslot >= KEYSLOT_AES_MAX) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     /* Generate the derived key, to be XOR'd with final output block. */
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ void se_calculate_sha256(void *dst, const void *src, size_t src_size) {
 /* RNG API */
 void se_initialize_rng(unsigned int keyslot) {
     if (keyslot >= KEYSLOT_AES_MAX) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     /* To initialize the RNG, we'll perform an RNG operation into an output buffer. */
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ void se_initialize_rng(unsigned int keyslot) {
 
 void se_generate_random(unsigned int keyslot, void *dst, size_t size) {
     if (keyslot >= KEYSLOT_AES_MAX) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     uint32_t num_blocks = size >> 4;
diff --git a/exosphere/sealedkeys.c b/exosphere/sealedkeys.c
index 42c0b89e7..450915c0e 100644
--- a/exosphere/sealedkeys.c
+++ b/exosphere/sealedkeys.c
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ void unseal_key_internal(unsigned int keyslot, const void *src, const uint8_t *s
 
 void seal_titlekey(void *dst, size_t dst_size, const void *src, size_t src_size) {
     if (dst_size != 0x10 || src_size != 0x10) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     seal_key_internal(dst, src, g_titlekey_seal_key_source);
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void seal_titlekey(void *dst, size_t dst_size, const void *src, size_t src_size)
 
 void unseal_titlekey(unsigned int keyslot, const void *src, size_t src_size) {
     if (src_size != 0x10) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     unseal_key_internal(keyslot, src, g_titlekey_seal_key_source);
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ void unseal_titlekey(unsigned int keyslot, const void *src, size_t src_size) {
 
 void seal_key(void *dst, size_t dst_size, const void *src, size_t src_size, unsigned int usecase) {
     if (usecase >= CRYPTOUSECASE_MAX || dst_size != 0x10 || src_size != 0x10) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ void seal_key(void *dst, size_t dst_size, const void *src, size_t src_size, unsi
 
 void unseal_key(unsigned int keyslot, const void *src, size_t src_size, unsigned int usecase) {
     if (usecase >= CRYPTOUSECASE_MAX || src_size != 0x10) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     unseal_key_internal(keyslot, src, g_seal_key_sources[usecase]);
diff --git a/exosphere/smc_api.c b/exosphere/smc_api.c
index 3e7ac973d..038b798d0 100644
--- a/exosphere/smc_api.c
+++ b/exosphere/smc_api.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #include "utils.h"
 #include "configitem.h"
 #include "cpu_context.h"
+#include "lock.h"
 #include "masterkey.h"
 #include "mc.h"
 #include "mmu.h"
@@ -103,7 +104,17 @@ smc_table_t g_smc_tables[2] = {
     }
 };
 
-bool g_is_smc_in_progress = false;
+bool g_is_user_smc_in_progress = false;
+bool g_is_priv_smc_in_progress = false;
+
+/* Privileged SMC lock must be available to exceptions.s. */
+void set_priv_smc_in_progress(void) {
+    lock_acquire(&g_is_priv_smc_in_progress);
+}
+void clear_priv_smc_in_progress(void) {
+    lock_release(&g_is_priv_smc_in_progress);
+}
+
 uint32_t (*g_smc_callback)(void *, uint64_t) = NULL;
 uint64_t g_smc_callback_key = 0;
 
@@ -134,28 +145,28 @@ void call_smc_handler(uint32_t handler_id, smc_args_t *args) {
     
     /* Validate top-level handler. */
     if (handler_id != SMC_HANDLER_USER && handler_id != SMC_HANDLER_PRIV) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     /* Validate core is appropriate for handler. */
     if (handler_id == SMC_HANDLER_USER && get_core_id() != 3) {
         /* USER SMCs must be called via svcCallSecureMonitor on core 3 (where spl runs) */
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     /* Validate sub-handler index */
     if ((smc_id = (unsigned char)args->X[0]) >= g_smc_tables[handler_id].num_handlers) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     /* Validate sub-handler */
     if (g_smc_tables[handler_id].handlers[smc_id].id != args->X[0]) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     /* Validate handler. */
     if ((smc_handler = g_smc_tables[handler_id].handlers[smc_id].handler) == NULL) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     /* Call function. */
@@ -164,30 +175,26 @@ void call_smc_handler(uint32_t handler_id, smc_args_t *args) {
 
 uint32_t smc_wrapper_sync(smc_args_t *args, uint32_t (*handler)(smc_args_t *)) {
     uint32_t result;
-    /* TODO: Make g_is_smc_in_progress atomic. */
-    if (g_is_smc_in_progress) {
+    if (!lock_try_acquire(&g_is_user_smc_in_progress)) {
         return 3;
     }
-    g_is_smc_in_progress = true;
     result = handler(args);
-    g_is_smc_in_progress = false;
+    lock_release(&g_is_user_smc_in_progress);
     return result;
 }
 
 uint32_t smc_wrapper_async(smc_args_t *args, uint32_t (*handler)(smc_args_t *), uint32_t (*callback)(void *, uint64_t)) {
     uint32_t result;
     uint64_t key;
-    /* TODO: Make g_is_smc_in_progress atomic. */
-    if (g_is_smc_in_progress) {
+    if (!lock_try_acquire(&g_is_user_smc_in_progress)) {
         return 3;
     }
-    g_is_smc_in_progress = 1;
     if ((key = try_set_smc_callback(callback)) != 0) {
         result = handler(args);
         if (result == 0) {
             /* Pass the status check key back to userland. */
             args->X[1] = key;
-            /* Early return, leaving g_is_smc_in_progress == 1 */
+            /* Early return, leaving g_is_user_smc_in_progress locked */
             return result;
         } else {
             /* No status to check. */
@@ -197,7 +204,7 @@ uint32_t smc_wrapper_async(smc_args_t *args, uint32_t (*handler)(smc_args_t *),
         /* smcCheckStatus needs to be called. */
         result = 3;
     }
-    g_is_smc_in_progress = false;
+    lock_release(&g_is_user_smc_in_progress);
     return result;
 }
 
@@ -277,7 +284,7 @@ uint32_t smc_exp_mod_get_result(void *buf, uint64_t size) {
     se_get_exp_mod_output(buf, 0x100);
     
     /* smc_exp_mod is done now. */
-    g_is_smc_in_progress = false;
+    lock_release(&g_is_user_smc_in_progress);
     return 0;
 }
 
@@ -303,7 +310,7 @@ uint32_t smc_crypt_aes_status_check(void *buf, uint64_t size) {
         return 3;
     }
     /* smc_crypt_aes is done now. */
-    g_is_smc_in_progress = false;
+    lock_release(&g_is_user_smc_in_progress);
     return 0;
 }
 
@@ -352,7 +359,7 @@ uint32_t smc_unwrap_rsa_oaep_wrapped_titlekey_get_result(void *buf, uint64_t siz
     se_get_exp_mod_output(rsa_wrapped_titlekey, 0x100);
     if (tkey_rsa_oaep_unwrap(aes_wrapped_titlekey, 0x10, rsa_wrapped_titlekey, 0x100) != 0x10) {
         /* Failed to extract RSA OAEP wrapped key. */
-        g_is_smc_in_progress = false;
+        lock_release(&g_is_user_smc_in_progress);
         return 2;
     }
     
@@ -363,7 +370,7 @@ uint32_t smc_unwrap_rsa_oaep_wrapped_titlekey_get_result(void *buf, uint64_t siz
     p_sealed_key[1] = sealed_titlekey[1];
     
     /* smc_unwrap_rsa_oaep_wrapped_titlekey is done now. */
-    g_is_smc_in_progress = false;
+    lock_release(&g_is_user_smc_in_progress);
     return 0;
 }
 
@@ -403,8 +410,7 @@ uint32_t smc_get_random_bytes_for_priv(smc_args_t *args) {
 
     uint32_t result;
 
-    /* TODO: Make atomic. */
-    if (g_is_smc_in_progress) {
+    if (!lock_try_acquire(&g_is_user_smc_in_progress)) {
         if (args->X[1] > 0x38) {
             return 2;
         }
@@ -413,12 +419,11 @@ uint32_t smc_get_random_bytes_for_priv(smc_args_t *args) {
         randomcache_getbytes(&args->X[1], num_bytes);
         result = 0;
     } else {
-        g_is_smc_in_progress = true;
         /* If the kernel isn't denied service by a usermode SMC, generate fresh random bytes. */
         result = user_get_random_bytes(args);
         /* Also, refill our cache while we have the chance in case we get denied later. */
         randomcache_refill();
-        g_is_smc_in_progress = false;
+        lock_release(&g_is_user_smc_in_progress);
     }
     return result;
 }
diff --git a/exosphere/smc_api.h b/exosphere/smc_api.h
index 1549f7cf9..a592079c1 100644
--- a/exosphere/smc_api.h
+++ b/exosphere/smc_api.h
@@ -10,6 +10,11 @@ typedef struct {
     uint64_t X[8];
 } smc_args_t;
 
+void set_priv_smc_in_progress(void);
+void clear_priv_smc_in_progress(void);
+
+void get_smc_core012_stack_address(void);
+
 void call_smc_handler(unsigned int handler_id, smc_args_t *args);
 
 #endif
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/exosphere/smc_user.c b/exosphere/smc_user.c
index 3f5db73c6..b4fb500f5 100644
--- a/exosphere/smc_user.c
+++ b/exosphere/smc_user.c
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ uint32_t user_crypt_aes(smc_args_t *args) {
     
     size_t size = args->X[6];
     if (size & 0xF) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     set_crypt_aes_done(false);
diff --git a/exosphere/titlekey.c b/exosphere/titlekey.c
index 91a6116c8..0873040ad 100644
--- a/exosphere/titlekey.c
+++ b/exosphere/titlekey.c
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ void tkey_set_expected_label_hash(uint64_t *label_hash) {
 
 void tkey_set_master_key_rev(unsigned int master_key_rev) {
     if (master_key_rev >= MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
 }
 
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ void calculate_mgf1_and_xor(void *masked, size_t masked_size, const void *seed,
     uint8_t cur_hash[0x20];
     uint8_t hash_buf[0xE4];
     if (seed_size >= 0xE0) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     size_t hash_buf_size = seed_size + 4;
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ void calculate_mgf1_and_xor(void *masked, size_t masked_size, const void *seed,
 
 size_t tkey_rsa_oaep_unwrap(void *dst, size_t dst_size, void *src, size_t src_size) {
     if (src_size != 0x100) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     /* RSA Wrapped titlekeys use RSA-OAEP. */
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ size_t tkey_rsa_oaep_unwrap(void *dst, size_t dst_size, void *src, size_t src_si
 
 void tkey_aes_unwrap(void *dst, size_t dst_size, const void *src, size_t src_size) {
     if (g_tkey_master_key_rev >= MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX || dst_size != 0x10 || src_size != 0x10) {
-        panic();
+        generic_panic();
     }
     
     const uint8_t titlekek_source[0x10] = {
diff --git a/exosphere/userpage.c b/exosphere/userpage.c
index fe2c23124..8b30f691e 100644
--- a/exosphere/userpage.c
+++ b/exosphere/userpage.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ bool upage_init(upage_ref_t *upage, void *user_address) {
     if (g_secure_page_user_address != NULL) {
         /* Different physical address indicate SPL was rebooted, or another process got access to svcCallSecureMonitor. Panic. */
         if (g_secure_page_user_address != upage->user_page) {
-            panic();
+            generic_panic();
         }
         upage->secure_page = SECURE_USER_PAGE_ADDR;
     } else {
diff --git a/exosphere/utils.h b/exosphere/utils.h
index 93e8a3bd8..9c0c894c6 100644
--- a/exosphere/utils.h
+++ b/exosphere/utils.h
@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@
 #define BIT(x)  (1u   << (x))
 #define BITL(x) (1ull << (x))
 
-void panic(void);
+void panic(uint32_t code);
+void generic_panic(void);
 
 uint32_t get_physical_address(void *vaddr);