Implement BootConfig.

This commit is contained in:
Michael Scire 2018-02-27 20:28:34 -08:00
parent d0b74d7751
commit c5b0639b8a
6 changed files with 159 additions and 76 deletions

View file

@ -1,40 +1,107 @@
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "utils.h"
#include "se.h"
#include "configitem.h"
#include "fuse.h"
#include "bootconfig.h"
static bootconfig_t g_loaded_bootconfig = {0};
bool bootconfig_matches_hardware_info(void) {
uint32_t hardware_info[4];
fuse_get_hardware_info(hardware_info);
return memcmp(g_loaded_bootconfig.signed_config.hardware_info, hardware_info, sizeof(hardware_info)) == 0;
}
void bootconfig_load_and_verify(const bootconfig_t *bootconfig) {
/* TODO */
static const uint8_t bootconfig_modulus[RSA_2048_BYTES] = {
0xB5, 0x96, 0x87, 0x31, 0x39, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0x3C, 0x28, 0xF3, 0xF0, 0x65, 0xF1, 0x50, 0x70, 0x64,
0xE6, 0x6C, 0x97, 0x50, 0xCD, 0xA6, 0xEE, 0xEA, 0xC3, 0x8F, 0xE6, 0xB5, 0x81, 0x54, 0x65, 0x33,
0x1B, 0x88, 0x4B, 0xCE, 0x9F, 0x53, 0xDF, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0xAD, 0xC3, 0x78, 0xD7, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0xDB,
0x27, 0x21, 0xA0, 0x24, 0x30, 0x2D, 0x98, 0x41, 0xA8, 0xDF, 0x50, 0x7D, 0xAB, 0xCE, 0x00, 0xD9,
0xCB, 0xAC, 0x8F, 0x37, 0xF5, 0x53, 0xE4, 0x97, 0x1F, 0x13, 0x3C, 0x19, 0xFF, 0x05, 0xA7, 0x3B,
0xF6, 0xF4, 0x01, 0xDE, 0xF0, 0xC3, 0x77, 0x7B, 0x83, 0xBA, 0xAF, 0x99, 0x30, 0x94, 0x87, 0x25,
0x4E, 0x54, 0x42, 0x3F, 0xAC, 0x27, 0xF9, 0xCC, 0x87, 0xDD, 0xAE, 0xF2, 0x54, 0xF3, 0x97, 0x49,
0xF4, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x6D, 0xDA, 0x60, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x57, 0xAE, 0x55, 0xA9, 0x76, 0xEA, 0x80, 0x24,
0xA0, 0x04, 0x7D, 0xBE, 0xD1, 0x81, 0xD3, 0x0C, 0x95, 0xCF, 0xB7, 0xE0, 0x2D, 0x21, 0x21, 0xFF,
0x97, 0x1E, 0xB3, 0xD7, 0x9F, 0xBB, 0x33, 0x0C, 0x23, 0xC5, 0x88, 0x4A, 0x33, 0xB9, 0xC9, 0x4E,
0x1E, 0x65, 0x51, 0x45, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x64, 0x7C, 0xF0, 0xBF, 0x11, 0xB4, 0x93, 0x8D, 0x5D, 0xC6,
0xAB, 0x37, 0x9E, 0xE9, 0x39, 0xC1, 0xC8, 0xDB, 0xB9, 0xFE, 0x45, 0xCE, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0x72, 0xD9,
0x6F, 0x68, 0x13, 0xC0, 0x4B, 0xBA, 0x00, 0xF4, 0x1E, 0x89, 0x71, 0x91, 0x26, 0xA6, 0x46, 0x12,
0xDF, 0x29, 0x6B, 0xC2, 0x5A, 0x53, 0xAF, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0xFD, 0x13, 0x9F, 0xD1, 0x8A, 0x7C, 0xB5,
0x04, 0xFD, 0x69, 0xEA, 0x23, 0xB4, 0x6D, 0x16, 0x21, 0x98, 0x54, 0xB4, 0xDF, 0xE6, 0xAB, 0x93,
0x36, 0xB6, 0xD2, 0x43, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x98, 0x1D, 0x45, 0xC9, 0xBB, 0x20, 0x42, 0xB1, 0x9D, 0x1D
};
memcpy(&g_loaded_bootconfig, bootconfig, sizeof(bootconfig_t));
/* TODO: Should these restrictions be loosened for Exosphere? */
if (configitem_is_retail()
|| se_rsa2048_pss_verify(g_loaded_bootconfig.signature, RSA_2048_BYTES, bootconfig_modulus, RSA_2048_BYTES, &g_loaded_bootconfig.signed_config, sizeof(g_loaded_bootconfig.signed_config)) != 0
|| !bootconfig_matches_hardware_info()) {
/* Clear signed config. */
memset(&g_loaded_bootconfig.signed_config, 0, sizeof(g_loaded_bootconfig.signed_config));
}
}
void bootconfig_clear(void){
/* TODO */
memset(&g_loaded_bootconfig, 0, sizeof(bootconfig_t));
}
/* Actual configuration getters. */
bool bootconfig_is_package2_plaintext(void) {
return false;
/* TODO */
return (g_loaded_bootconfig.signed_config.package2_config & 1) != 0;
}
bool bootconfig_is_package2_unsigned(void) {
return false;
/* TODO */
return (g_loaded_bootconfig.signed_config.package2_config & 2) != 0;
}
bool bootconfig_disable_program_verification(void) {
return false;
/* TODO */
return g_loaded_bootconfig.signed_config.disable_program_verification != 0;
}
bool bootconfig_is_debug_mode(void) {
return false;
/* TODO */
return (g_loaded_bootconfig.unsigned_config.data[0x10] & 2) != 0;
}
uint64_t bootconfig_get_memory_arrangement(void) {
return 0ull;
/* TODO */
if (bootconfig_is_debug_mode()) {
if (fuse_get_dram_id() == 4) {
if (g_loaded_bootconfig.unsigned_config.data[0x23]) {
return (uint64_t)(g_loaded_bootconfig.unsigned_config.data[0x23]);
} else {
return 0x11ull;
}
} else {
if (g_loaded_bootconfig.unsigned_config.data[0x23]) {
if ((g_loaded_bootconfig.unsigned_config.data[0x23] & 0x30) == 0) {
return (uint64_t)(g_loaded_bootconfig.unsigned_config.data[0x23]);
} else {
return 1ull;
}
} else {
return 1ull;
}
}
} else {
return 1ull;
}
}
uint64_t bootconfig_get_kernel_memory_configuration(void) {
return 0ull;
/* TODO */
if (bootconfig_is_debug_mode()) {
uint64_t high_val = 0;
if (fuse_get_dram_id() == 4) {
if (g_loaded_bootconfig.unsigned_config.data[0x23]) {
high_val = ((uint64_t)(g_loaded_bootconfig.unsigned_config.data[0x23]) >> 4) & 0x3;
} else {
high_val = 0x1;
}
}
return (high_val << 16) | (((uint64_t)(g_loaded_bootconfig.unsigned_config.data[0x21])) << 8) | ((uint64_t)(g_loaded_bootconfig.unsigned_config.data[0x11]));
} else {
return 0ull;
}
}

View file

@ -7,9 +7,22 @@
/* This provides management for Switch BootConfig. */
typedef struct {
uint8_t unsigned_config[0x200];
uint8_t data[0x200];
} bootconfig_unsigned_config_t;
typedef struct {
uint8_t _0x0[8];
uint8_t package2_config;
uint8_t _0x9[7];
uint8_t hardware_info[0x10];
uint8_t disable_program_verification;
uint8_t _0x21[0xDF];
} bootconfig_signed_config_t;
typedef struct {
bootconfig_unsigned_config_t unsigned_config;
uint8_t signature[0x100];
uint8_t signed_config[0x100];
bootconfig_signed_config_t signed_config;
uint8_t unknown_config[0x240];
} bootconfig_t;

View file

@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ void intr_initialize_gic(void) {
/* Initializes Interrupt Groups 1-7 in the GIC. Called by pk2ldr. */
void intr_initialize_gic_nonsecure(void) {
for (unsigned int i = 1; i < 8; i++) {
GICD_IGROUPR[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF
GICD_IGROUPR[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
}
for (unsigned int i = 0x20; i < 0xE0; i++) {

View file

@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#include "package2.h"
#include "configitem.h"
#include "se.h"
#include "interrupt.h"
#include "masterkey.h"
#include "arm.h"
#include "randomcache.h"
@ -79,62 +80,6 @@ static void setup_boot_config(void) {
}
}
static bool rsa2048_pss_verify(const void *signature, size_t signature_size, const void *modulus, size_t modulus_size, const void *data, size_t data_size) {
uint8_t message[RSA_2048_BYTES];
uint8_t h_buf[0x24];
/* Hardcode RSA with keyslot 0. */
const uint8_t public_exponent[4] = {0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01};
set_rsa_keyslot(0, modulus, modulus_size, public_exponent, sizeof(public_exponent));
se_synchronous_exp_mod(0, message, sizeof(message), signature, signature_size);
/* Validate sanity byte. */
if (message[RSA_2048_BYTES - 1] != 0xBC) {
return false;
}
/* Copy Salt into MGF1 Hash Buffer. */
memset(h_buf, 0, sizeof(h_buf));
memcpy(h_buf, message + RSA_2048_BYTES - 0x20 - 0x1, 0x20);
/* Decrypt maskedDB (via inline MGF1). */
uint8_t seed = 0;
uint8_t mgf1_buf[0x20];
for (unsigned int ofs = 0; ofs < RSA_2048_BYTES - 0x20 - 1; ofs += 0x20) {
h_buf[sizeof(h_buf) - 1] = seed++;
flush_dcache_range(h_buf, h_buf + sizeof(h_buf));
se_calculate_sha256(mgf1_buf, h_buf, sizeof(h_buf));
for (unsigned int i = ofs; i < ofs + 0x20 && i < RSA_2048_BYTES - 0x20 - 1; i++) {
message[i] ^= mgf1_buf[i - ofs];
}
}
/* Constant lmask for rsa-2048-pss. */
message[0] &= 0x7F;
/* Validate DB is of the form 0000...0001. */
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < RSA_2048_BYTES - 0x20 - 0x20 - 1 - 1; i++) {
if (message[i] != 0) {
return false;
}
}
if (message[RSA_2048_BYTES - 0x20 - 0x20 - 1 - 1] != 1) {
return false;
}
/* Check hash correctness. */
uint8_t validate_buf[8 + 0x20 + 0x20];
uint8_t validate_hash[0x20];
memset(validate_buf, 0, sizeof(validate_buf));
flush_dcache_range((uint8_t *)data, (uint8_t *)data + data_size);
se_calculate_sha256(&validate_buf[8], data, data_size);
memcpy(&validate_buf[0x28], &message[RSA_2048_BYTES - 0x20 - 0x20 - 1], 0x20);
flush_dcache_range(validate_buf, validate_buf + sizeof(validate_buf));
se_calculate_sha256(validate_hash, validate_buf, sizeof(validate_buf));
return memcmp(h_buf, validate_hash, 0x20) == 0;
}
static void package2_crypt_ctr(unsigned int master_key_rev, void *dst, size_t dst_size, const void *src, size_t src_size, const void *ctr, size_t ctr_size) {
/* Derive package2 key. */
const uint8_t package2_key_source[0x10] = {0xFB, 0x8B, 0x6A, 0x9C, 0x79, 0x00, 0xC8, 0x49, 0xEF, 0xD2, 0x4D, 0x85, 0x4D, 0x30, 0xA0, 0xC7};
@ -152,7 +97,7 @@ static void verify_header_signature(package2_header_t *header) {
const uint8_t *modulus;
if (configitem_is_retail()) {
const uint8_t package2_modulus_retail[0x100] = {
static const uint8_t package2_modulus_retail[0x100] = {
0x8D, 0x13, 0xA7, 0x77, 0x6A, 0xE5, 0xDC, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x25, 0xD0, 0x58, 0xE4, 0x20, 0x69, 0x59,
0x55, 0x4B, 0xAB, 0x70, 0x40, 0x08, 0x28, 0x07, 0xA8, 0xA7, 0xFD, 0x0F, 0x31, 0x2E, 0x11, 0xFE,
0x47, 0xA0, 0xF9, 0x9D, 0xDF, 0x80, 0xDB, 0x86, 0x5A, 0x27, 0x89, 0xCD, 0x97, 0x6C, 0x85, 0xC5,
@ -172,7 +117,7 @@ static void verify_header_signature(package2_header_t *header) {
};
modulus = package2_modulus_retail;
} else {
const uint8_t package2_modulus_dev[0x100] = {
static const uint8_t package2_modulus_dev[0x100] = {
0xB3, 0x65, 0x54, 0xFB, 0x0A, 0xB0, 0x1E, 0x85, 0xA7, 0xF6, 0xCF, 0x91, 0x8E, 0xBA, 0x96, 0x99,
0x0D, 0x8B, 0x91, 0x69, 0x2A, 0xEE, 0x01, 0x20, 0x4F, 0x34, 0x5C, 0x2C, 0x4F, 0x4E, 0x37, 0xC7,
0xF1, 0x0B, 0xD4, 0xCD, 0xA1, 0x7F, 0x93, 0xF1, 0x33, 0x59, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0xE9, 0xDD, 0x26, 0xE6,
@ -194,7 +139,7 @@ static void verify_header_signature(package2_header_t *header) {
}
/* This is normally only allowed on dev units, but we'll allow it anywhere. */
if (bootconfig_is_package2_unsigned() == 0 && rsa2048_pss_verify(header->signature, 0x100, modulus, 0x100, header->encrypted_header, 0x100) == 0) {
if (bootconfig_is_package2_unsigned() == 0 && se_rsa2048_pss_verify(header->signature, 0x100, modulus, 0x100, header->encrypted_header, 0x100) == 0) {
generic_panic();
}
}

View file

@ -340,6 +340,63 @@ void se_get_exp_mod_output(void *buf, size_t size) {
}
}
bool se_rsa2048_pss_verify(const void *signature, size_t signature_size, const void *modulus, size_t modulus_size, const void *data, size_t data_size) {
uint8_t message[RSA_2048_BYTES];
uint8_t h_buf[0x24];
/* Hardcode RSA with keyslot 0. */
const uint8_t public_exponent[4] = {0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01};
set_rsa_keyslot(0, modulus, modulus_size, public_exponent, sizeof(public_exponent));
se_synchronous_exp_mod(0, message, sizeof(message), signature, signature_size);
/* Validate sanity byte. */
if (message[RSA_2048_BYTES - 1] != 0xBC) {
return false;
}
/* Copy Salt into MGF1 Hash Buffer. */
memset(h_buf, 0, sizeof(h_buf));
memcpy(h_buf, message + RSA_2048_BYTES - 0x20 - 0x1, 0x20);
/* Decrypt maskedDB (via inline MGF1). */
uint8_t seed = 0;
uint8_t mgf1_buf[0x20];
for (unsigned int ofs = 0; ofs < RSA_2048_BYTES - 0x20 - 1; ofs += 0x20) {
h_buf[sizeof(h_buf) - 1] = seed++;
flush_dcache_range(h_buf, h_buf + sizeof(h_buf));
se_calculate_sha256(mgf1_buf, h_buf, sizeof(h_buf));
for (unsigned int i = ofs; i < ofs + 0x20 && i < RSA_2048_BYTES - 0x20 - 1; i++) {
message[i] ^= mgf1_buf[i - ofs];
}
}
/* Constant lmask for rsa-2048-pss. */
message[0] &= 0x7F;
/* Validate DB is of the form 0000...0001. */
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < RSA_2048_BYTES - 0x20 - 0x20 - 1 - 1; i++) {
if (message[i] != 0) {
return false;
}
}
if (message[RSA_2048_BYTES - 0x20 - 0x20 - 1 - 1] != 1) {
return false;
}
/* Check hash correctness. */
uint8_t validate_buf[8 + 0x20 + 0x20];
uint8_t validate_hash[0x20];
memset(validate_buf, 0, sizeof(validate_buf));
flush_dcache_range((uint8_t *)data, (uint8_t *)data + data_size);
se_calculate_sha256(&validate_buf[8], data, data_size);
memcpy(&validate_buf[0x28], &message[RSA_2048_BYTES - 0x20 - 0x20 - 1], 0x20);
flush_dcache_range(validate_buf, validate_buf + sizeof(validate_buf));
se_calculate_sha256(validate_hash, validate_buf, sizeof(validate_buf));
return memcmp(h_buf, validate_hash, 0x20) == 0;
}
void trigger_se_rsa_op(void *buf, size_t size) {
se_ll_t in_ll;
ll_init(&in_ll, (void *)buf, size);

View file

@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ void se_calculate_sha256(void *dst, const void *src, size_t src_size);
void se_exp_mod(unsigned int keyslot, void *buf, size_t size, unsigned int (*callback)(void));
void se_get_exp_mod_output(void *buf, size_t size);
void se_synchronous_exp_mod(unsigned int keyslot, void *dst, size_t dst_size, const void *src, size_t src_size);
bool se_rsa2048_pss_verify(const void *signature, size_t signature_size, const void *modulus, size_t modulus_size, const void *data, size_t data_size);
/* RNG API */
void se_initialize_rng(unsigned int keyslot);