exo2: implement SmcGenerateAesKek, SmcLoadAesKey

This commit is contained in:
Michael Scire 2020-05-15 11:10:28 -07:00 committed by SciresM
parent 864b6085a8
commit bf546d5fb3
8 changed files with 239 additions and 65 deletions

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@ -15,18 +15,198 @@
*/
#include <exosphere.hpp>
#include "../secmon_error.hpp"
#include "../secmon_key_storage.hpp"
#include "../secmon_misc.hpp"
#include "secmon_smc_aes.hpp"
#include "secmon_smc_se_lock.hpp"
namespace ams::secmon::smc {
namespace {
constexpr inline auto AesKeySize = se::AesBlockSize;
enum SealKey {
SealKey_LoadAesKey = 0,
SealKey_DecryptDeviceUniqueData = 1,
SealKey_LoadLotusKey = 2,
SealKey_LoadEsDeviceKey = 3,
SealKey_ReencryptDeviceUniqueData = 4,
SealKey_LoadSslKey = 5,
SealKey_LoadEsClientCertKey = 6,
SealKey_Count,
};
enum KeyType {
KeyType_Default = 0,
KeyType_NormalOnly = 1,
KeyType_RecoveryOnly = 2,
KeyType_NormalAndRecovery = 3,
KeyType_Count,
};
struct GenerateAesKekOption {
using IsDeviceUnique = util::BitPack32::Field<0, 1, bool>;
using KeyTypeIndex = util::BitPack32::Field<1, 4, KeyType>;
using SealKeyIndex = util::BitPack32::Field<5, 3, SealKey>;
using Reserved = util::BitPack32::Field<8, 24, u32>;
};
constexpr const u8 SealKeySources[SealKey_Count][AesKeySize] = {
[SealKey_LoadAesKey] = { 0xF4, 0x0C, 0x16, 0x26, 0x0D, 0x46, 0x3B, 0xE0, 0x8C, 0x6A, 0x56, 0xE5, 0x82, 0xD4, 0x1B, 0xF6 },
[SealKey_DecryptDeviceUniqueData] = { 0x7F, 0x54, 0x2C, 0x98, 0x1E, 0x54, 0x18, 0x3B, 0xBA, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x4C, 0x13, 0x5B, 0xF1, 0x06 },
[SealKey_LoadLotusKey] = { 0xC7, 0x3F, 0x73, 0x60, 0xB7, 0xB9, 0x9D, 0x74, 0x0A, 0xF8, 0x35, 0x60, 0x1A, 0x18, 0x74, 0x63 },
[SealKey_LoadEsDeviceKey] = { 0x0E, 0xE0, 0xC4, 0x33, 0x82, 0x66, 0xE8, 0x08, 0x39, 0x13, 0x41, 0x7D, 0x04, 0x64, 0x2B, 0x6D },
[SealKey_ReencryptDeviceUniqueData] = { 0xE1, 0xA8, 0xAA, 0x6A, 0x2D, 0x9C, 0xDE, 0x43, 0x0C, 0xDE, 0xC6, 0x17, 0xF6, 0xC7, 0xF1, 0xDE },
[SealKey_LoadSslKey] = { 0x74, 0x20, 0xF6, 0x46, 0x77, 0xB0, 0x59, 0x2C, 0xE8, 0x1B, 0x58, 0x64, 0x47, 0x41, 0x37, 0xD9 },
[SealKey_LoadEsClientCertKey] = { 0xAA, 0x19, 0x0F, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0x30, 0x3B, 0x2E, 0xE6, 0xD8, 0x9A, 0xCF, 0xE5, 0x3F, 0xB3, 0x4B },
};
constexpr const u8 KeyTypeSources[KeyType_Count][AesKeySize] = {
[KeyType_Default] = { 0x4D, 0x87, 0x09, 0x86, 0xC4, 0x5D, 0x20, 0x72, 0x2F, 0xBA, 0x10, 0x53, 0xDA, 0x92, 0xE8, 0xA9 },
[KeyType_NormalOnly] = { 0x25, 0x03, 0x31, 0xFB, 0x25, 0x26, 0x0B, 0x79, 0x8C, 0x80, 0xD2, 0x69, 0x98, 0xE2, 0x22, 0x77 },
[KeyType_RecoveryOnly] = { 0x76, 0x14, 0x1D, 0x34, 0x93, 0x2D, 0xE1, 0x84, 0x24, 0x7B, 0x66, 0x65, 0x55, 0x04, 0x65, 0x81 },
[KeyType_NormalAndRecovery] = { 0xAF, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0xF3, 0x08, 0xA2, 0xD8, 0xA2, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0xA8, 0x69, 0x46, 0xC9, 0x0B },
};
constexpr const u8 SealKeyMasks[SealKey_Count][AesKeySize] = {
[SealKey_LoadAesKey] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
[SealKey_DecryptDeviceUniqueData] = { 0xA2, 0xAB, 0xBF, 0x9C, 0x92, 0x2F, 0xBB, 0xE3, 0x78, 0x79, 0x9B, 0xC0, 0xCC, 0xEA, 0xA5, 0x74 },
[SealKey_LoadLotusKey] = { 0x57, 0xE2, 0xD9, 0x45, 0xE4, 0x92, 0xF4, 0xFD, 0xC3, 0xF9, 0x86, 0x38, 0x89, 0x78, 0x9F, 0x3C },
[SealKey_LoadEsDeviceKey] = { 0xE5, 0x4D, 0x9A, 0x02, 0xF0, 0x4F, 0x5F, 0xA8, 0xAD, 0x76, 0x0A, 0xF6, 0x32, 0x95, 0x59, 0xBB },
[SealKey_ReencryptDeviceUniqueData] = { 0x59, 0xD9, 0x31, 0xF4, 0xA7, 0x97, 0xB8, 0x14, 0x40, 0xD6, 0xA2, 0x60, 0x2B, 0xED, 0x15, 0x31 },
[SealKey_LoadSslKey] = { 0xFD, 0x6A, 0x25, 0xE5, 0xD8, 0x38, 0x7F, 0x91, 0x49, 0xDA, 0xF8, 0x59, 0xA8, 0x28, 0xE6, 0x75 },
[SealKey_LoadEsClientCertKey] = { 0x89, 0x96, 0x43, 0x9A, 0x7C, 0xD5, 0x59, 0x55, 0x24, 0xD5, 0x24, 0x18, 0xAB, 0x6C, 0x04, 0x61 },
};
int PrepareMasterKey(int generation) {
if (generation == GetKeyGeneration()) {
return pkg1::AesKeySlot_Master;
}
constexpr int Slot = pkg1::AesKeySlot_Smc;
LoadMasterKey(Slot, generation);
return Slot;
}
int PrepareDeviceMasterKey(int generation) {
if (generation == pkg1::KeyGeneration_1_0_0) {
return pkg1::AesKeySlot_Device;
}
if (generation == GetKeyGeneration()) {
return pkg1::AesKeySlot_DeviceMaster;
}
constexpr int Slot = pkg1::AesKeySlot_Smc;
LoadDeviceMasterKey(Slot, generation);
return Slot;
}
SmcResult GenerateAesKekImpl(SmcArguments &args) {
/* Decode arguments. */
u8 kek_source[AesKeySize];
std::memcpy(kek_source, std::addressof(args.r[1]), AesKeySize);
const int generation = std::min<int>(args.r[3] - 1, pkg1::KeyGeneration_1_0_0);
const util::BitPack32 option = { static_cast<u32>(args.r[4]) };
const bool is_device_unique = option.Get<GenerateAesKekOption::IsDeviceUnique>();
const auto key_type = option.Get<GenerateAesKekOption::KeyTypeIndex>();
const auto seal_key = option.Get<GenerateAesKekOption::SealKeyIndex>();
const u32 reserved = option.Get<GenerateAesKekOption::Reserved>();
/* Validate arguments. */
SMC_R_UNLESS(reserved == 0, InvalidArgument);
if (is_device_unique) {
SMC_R_UNLESS(pkg1::IsValidDeviceUniqueKeyGeneration(generation), InvalidArgument);
} else {
SMC_R_UNLESS(pkg1::IsValidKeyGeneration(generation), InvalidArgument);
SMC_R_UNLESS(generation <= GetKeyGeneration(), InvalidArgument);
}
SMC_R_UNLESS(0 <= key_type && key_type < KeyType_Count, InvalidArgument);
SMC_R_UNLESS(0 <= seal_key && seal_key < SealKey_Count, InvalidArgument);
switch (key_type) {
case KeyType_NormalOnly: SMC_R_UNLESS(!IsRecoveryBoot(), InvalidArgument); break;
case KeyType_RecoveryOnly: SMC_R_UNLESS( IsRecoveryBoot(), InvalidArgument); break;
default: break;
}
/* Declare temporary data storage. */
u8 static_source[AesKeySize];
u8 generated_key[AesKeySize];
u8 access_key[AesKeySize];
/* Derive the static source. */
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(static_source); ++i) {
static_source[i] = KeyTypeSources[key_type][i] ^ SealKeyMasks[seal_key][i];
}
/* Get the seal key source. */
const u8 * const seal_key_source = SealKeySources[seal_key];
/* Get the key slot. */
const int slot = is_device_unique ? PrepareDeviceMasterKey(generation) : PrepareMasterKey(generation);
/* Derive a static generation kek. */
se::SetEncryptedAesKey128(pkg1::AesKeySlot_Smc, slot, static_source, sizeof(static_source));
/* Decrypt the input with the static generation kek. */
se::DecryptAes128(generated_key, sizeof(generated_key), pkg1::AesKeySlot_Smc, kek_source, sizeof(kek_source));
/* Generate the seal key. */
se::SetEncryptedAesKey128(pkg1::AesKeySlot_Smc, pkg1::AesKeySlot_RandomForUserWrap, seal_key_source, AesKeySize);
/* Seal the generated key. */
se::EncryptAes128(access_key, sizeof(access_key), pkg1::AesKeySlot_Smc, generated_key, sizeof(generated_key));
/* Copy the access key out. */
std::memcpy(std::addressof(args.r[1]), access_key, sizeof(access_key));
return SmcResult::Success;
}
SmcResult LoadAesKeyImpl(SmcArguments &args) {
/* Decode arguments. */
const int slot = args.r[1];
u8 access_key[AesKeySize];
std::memcpy(access_key, std::addressof(args.r[2]), sizeof(access_key));
u8 key_source[AesKeySize];
std::memcpy(key_source, std::addressof(args.r[4]), sizeof(key_source));
/* Validate arguments. */
SMC_R_UNLESS(pkg1::IsUserAesKeySlot(slot), InvalidArgument);
/* Get the seal key source. */
constexpr const u8 * const SealKeySource = SealKeySources[SealKey_LoadAesKey];
/* Derive the seal key. */
se::SetEncryptedAesKey128(pkg1::AesKeySlot_Smc, pkg1::AesKeySlot_RandomForUserWrap, SealKeySource, AesKeySize);
/* Unseal the access key. */
se::SetEncryptedAesKey128(pkg1::AesKeySlot_Smc, pkg1::AesKeySlot_Smc, access_key, sizeof(access_key));
/* Derive the key. */
se::SetEncryptedAesKey128(slot, pkg1::AesKeySlot_Smc, key_source, sizeof(key_source));
return SmcResult::Success;
}
}
SmcResult SmcGenerateAesKek(SmcArguments &args) {
/* TODO */
return SmcResult::NotImplemented;
return LockSecurityEngineAndInvoke(args, GenerateAesKekImpl);
}
SmcResult SmcLoadAesKey(SmcArguments &args) {
/* TODO */
return SmcResult::NotImplemented;
return LockSecurityEngineAndInvoke(args, LoadAesKeyImpl);
}
SmcResult SmcComputeAes(SmcArguments &args) {

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@ -35,6 +35,12 @@ namespace ams::secmon::smc {
PsciAlreadyOn = static_cast<u32>(-4),
};
#define SMC_R_SUCCEEEDED(res) (res == SmcResult::Success)
#define SMC_R_FAILED(res) (res != SmcResult::Success)
#define SMC_R_TRY(res_expr) ({ const auto _tmp_r_try_rc = (res_expr); if (SMC_R_FAILED(_tmp_r_try_rc)) { return _tmp_r_try_rc; } })
#define SMC_R_UNLESS(cond, RES) ({ if (!(cond)) { return SmcResult::RES; }})
struct SmcArguments {
u64 r[8];
};

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@ -104,14 +104,10 @@ namespace ams::secmon::smc {
SmcResult SmcPowerOnCpu(SmcArguments &args) {
/* Get and validate the core to power on. */
const int which_core = args.r[1];
if (!(0 <= which_core && which_core < NumCores)) {
return SmcResult::PsciInvalidParameters;
}
SMC_R_UNLESS(0 <= which_core && which_core < NumCores, PsciInvalidParameters);
/* Ensure the core isn't already on. */
if (IsCoreOn(which_core)) {
return SmcResult::PsciAlreadyOn;
}
SMC_R_UNLESS(!IsCoreOn(which_core), PsciAlreadyOn);
/* Save the entry context. */
SetEntryContext(which_core, args.r[2], args.r[3]);

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@ -26,10 +26,7 @@ namespace ams::secmon::smc {
SmcResult GenerateRandomBytesImpl(SmcArguments &args) {
/* Validate the input size. */
const size_t size = args.r[1];
if (size > MaxRandomBytes) {
return SmcResult::InvalidArgument;
}
SMC_R_UNLESS(size <= MaxRandomBytes, InvalidArgument);
/* Create a buffer that the se can generate bytes into. */
util::AlignedBuffer<hw::DataCacheLineSize, MaxRandomBytes> buffer;
@ -69,11 +66,7 @@ namespace ams::secmon::smc {
} else {
/* Otherwise, we'll retrieve some bytes from the cache. */
const size_t size = args.r[1];
/* Validate the input size. */
if (size > MaxRandomBytes) {
return SmcResult::InvalidArgument;
}
SMC_R_UNLESS(size <= MaxRandomBytes, InvalidArgument);
/* Get random bytes from the cache. */
GetRandomFromCache(std::addressof(args.r[1]), size);

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@ -150,27 +150,13 @@ namespace ams::secmon::smc {
const u32 value = args.r[3];
/* Validate that the address is aligned. */
if (!util::IsAligned(address, alignof(u32))) {
return SmcResult::InvalidArgument;
}
SMC_R_UNLESS(util::IsAligned(address, alignof(u32)), InvalidArgument);
/* Find the access table. */
const AccessTableEntry * const entry = GetAccessTableEntry(address);
/* If we have no table, don't perform the write. */
if (entry == nullptr) {
/* For no clearly discernable reason, SmcReadWriteRegister returns success despite not doing the read/write */
/* when accessing the SMMU controls for the BPMP and for APB-DMA. */
/* This is "probably" to fuck with hackers who got access to the SMC and are trying to get control of the */
/* BPMP to exploit jamais vu, deja vu, or other related DMA/wake-from-sleep vulnerabilities. */
constexpr uintptr_t MC = MemoryRegionVirtualDeviceMemoryController.GetAddress();
if (address == (MC + MC_SMMU_AVPC_ASID) || address == (MC + MC_SMMU_PPCS1_ASID)) {
return SmcResult::Success;
}
return SmcResult::InvalidArgument;
}
/* If we have a table, perform the write. */
if (entry != nullptr) {
/* Get the address to read or write. */
const uintptr_t virtual_address = entry->virtual_address + (address - entry->address);
u32 out = 0;
@ -183,6 +169,15 @@ namespace ams::secmon::smc {
}
args.r[1] = out;
} else {
/* For no clearly discernable reason, SmcReadWriteRegister returns success despite not doing the read/write */
/* when accessing the SMMU controls for the BPMP and for APB-DMA. */
/* This is "probably" to fuck with hackers who got access to the SMC and are trying to get control of the */
/* BPMP to exploit jamais vu, deja vu, or other related DMA/wake-from-sleep vulnerabilities. */
constexpr uintptr_t MC = MemoryRegionPhysicalDeviceMemoryController.GetAddress();
SMC_R_UNLESS((address == (MC + MC_SMMU_AVPC_ASID) || address == (MC + MC_SMMU_PPCS1_ASID)), InvalidArgument);
}
return SmcResult::Success;
}

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@ -39,40 +39,32 @@ namespace ams::secmon::smc {
}
SmcResult LockSecurityEngineAndInvoke(SmcArguments &args, SmcHandler impl) {
/* Try to lock the SE. */
if (!TryLockSecurityEngine()) {
return SmcResult::Busy;
}
/* Try to lock the security engine. */
SMC_R_UNLESS(TryLockSecurityEngine(), Busy);
ON_SCOPE_EXIT { UnlockSecurityEngine(); };
return impl(args);
}
SmcResult LockSecurityEngineAndInvokeAsync(SmcArguments &args, SmcHandler impl, GetResultHandler result_handler) {
SmcResult result = SmcResult::Busy;
/* Try to lock the security engine. */
if (TryLockSecurityEngine()) {
/* Try to start an async operation. */
if (const u64 async_key = BeginAsyncOperation(result_handler); async_key != InvalidAsyncKey) {
/* Invoke the operation. */
result = impl(args);
SMC_R_UNLESS(TryLockSecurityEngine(), Busy);
auto se_guard = SCOPE_GUARD { UnlockSecurityEngine(); };
/* Try to start an async operation. */
const u64 async_key = BeginAsyncOperation(result_handler);
SMC_R_UNLESS(async_key != InvalidAsyncKey, Busy);
auto async_guard = SCOPE_GUARD { CancelAsyncOperation(async_key); };
/* Try to invoke the operation. */
SMC_R_TRY(impl(args));
/* We succeeded! Cancel our guards, and return the async key to our caller. */
async_guard.Cancel();
se_guard.Cancel();
/* If the operation was successful, return the key. */
if (result == SmcResult::Success) {
args.r[1] = async_key;
return SmcResult::Success;
}
/* Otherwise, cancel the async operation. */
CancelAsyncOperation(async_key);
}
/* We failed to invoke the async op, so unlock the security engine. */
UnlockSecurityEngine();
}
return result;
}
}

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@ -44,4 +44,12 @@ namespace ams::pkg1 {
constexpr inline const int OldMasterKeyCount = KeyGeneration_Count - 1;
constexpr inline const int OldDeviceMasterKeyCount = KeyGeneration_Count - KeyGeneration_4_0_0;
constexpr bool IsValidDeviceUniqueKeyGeneration(int generation) {
return generation == KeyGeneration_1_0_0 || (KeyGeneration_4_0_0 <= generation && generation <= KeyGeneration_Current);
}
constexpr bool IsValidKeyGeneration(int generation) {
return KeyGeneration_Min <= generation && generation <= KeyGeneration_Current;
}
}

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@ -53,4 +53,8 @@ namespace ams::pkg1 {
RsaKeySlot_PrivateKey = 1,
};
constexpr bool IsUserAesKeySlot(int slot) {
return AesKeySlot_UserStart <= slot && slot < AesKeySlot_UserEnd;
}
}