diff --git a/exosphere/gcm.c b/exosphere/gcm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7eae551ba --- /dev/null +++ b/exosphere/gcm.c @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +#include + +#include "utils.h" +#include "gcm.h" + +#include "sealedkeys.h" +#include "se.h" + +/* Shifts right a little endian 128-bit value. */ +void shr_128(uint64_t *val) { + val[0] >>= 1; + val[0] |= (val[1] & 1) << 63; + val[1] >>= 1; +} + +/* Shifts left a little endian 128-bit value. */ +void shl_128(uint64_t *val) { + val[1] <<= 1; + val[1] |= (val[0] & (1ULL << 63)) >> 63; + val[0] <<= 1; +} + + +/* Multiplies two 128-bit numbers X,Y in the GF(128) Galois Field. */ +void gf128_mul(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *x, const uint8_t *y) { + uint8_t x_work[0x10]; + uint8_t y_work[0x10]; + uint8_t dst_work[0x10]; + + uint64_t *p_x = (uint64_t *)(&x_work[0]); + uint64_t *p_y = (uint64_t *)(&y_work[0]); + uint64_t *p_dst = (uint64_t *)(&dst_work[0]); + + /* Initialize buffers. */ + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 0x10; i++) { + x_work[i] = x[0xF-i]; + y_work[i] = y[0xF-i]; + dst_work[i] = 0; + } + + /* Perform operation for each bit in y. */ + for (unsigned int round = 0; round < 0x80; round++) { + p_dst[0] ^= p_x[0] * ((y_work[0xF] & 0x80) >> 7); + p_dst[1] ^= p_x[1] * ((y_work[0xF] & 0x80) >> 7); + shl_128(p_y); + uint8_t xor = 0xE1 * (x_work[0] & 1); + shr_128(p_x); + x_work[0xF] ^= xor; + } + + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 0x10; i++) { + dst[i] = dst_work[0xF-i]; + } +} + + + +/* Performs an AES-GCM GHASH operation over the data into dst. */ +void ghash(void *dst, const void *data, size_t data_size, const void *j_block, int encrypt) { + uint8_t x[0x10]; + uint8_t h[0x10]; + + uint64_t *p_x = (uint64_t *)(&x[0]); + uint64_t *p_data = (uint64_t *)data; + + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 0x10; i++) { + x[i] = 0; + } + + /* H = aes_ecb_encrypt(zeroes) */ + se_aes_ecb_encrypt_block(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, h, 0x10, x, 0x10); + + size_t total_size = data_size; + + while (data_size >= 0x10) { + /* X = (X ^ current_block) * H */ + p_x[0] ^= p_data[0]; + p_x[1] ^= p_data[1]; + + gf128_mul(x, x, h) + + /* Increment p_data by 0x10 bytes. */ + p_data += 2; + data_size -= 0x10; + } + + /* Nintendo's code *discards all data in the last block* if unaligned. */ + /* And treats that block as though it were all-zero. */ + /* This is a bug, they just forget to XOR with the copy of the last block they save. */ + if (data_size & 0xF) { + gf128_mul(x, x, h) + } + + /* Due to a Nintendo bug, the wrong QWORD gets XOR'd in the "final output block" case. */ + if (encrypt) { + p_x[1] ^= (uint64_t)(total_size << 3); + } else { + p_x[0] ^= (uint64_t)(total_size << 3); + } + + gf128_mul(x, x, h) + + /* If final output block, XOR with encrypted J block. */ + if (encrypt) { + se_aes_ecb_encrypt_block(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, h, 0x10, j_block, 0x10); + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 0x10; i++) { + x[i] ^= h[i]; + } + } + + /* Copy output. */ + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 0x10; i++) { + ((uint8_t *)dst)[i] = x[i]; + } + +} + + +/* This function is a doozy. It decrypts and validates a (non-standard) AES-GCM wrapped keypair. */ +int gcm_decrypt_key(unsigned int keyslot, void *dst, size_t dst_size, const void *src, size_t src_size, const void *sealed_kek, size_t kek_size, const void *wrapped_key, size_t key_size, unsigned int usecase, int is_personalized) { + + + if (is_personalized == 0) { + /* Devkit keys use a different keyformat without a MAC/Device ID. */ + if (src_size <= 0x10 || src_size - 0x10 > dst_size) { + panic(); + } + } else { + if (src_size <= 0x30 || src_size - 0x20 > dst_size) { + panic(); + } + } + + /* Unwrap the key */ + unseal_key(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, sealed_kek, kek_size, usecase); + decrypt_data_into_keyslot(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, wrapped_key, key_size); + + /* Decrypt the GCM keypair, AES-CTR with CTR = blob[:0x10]. */ + se_aes_ctr_crypt(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, dst, dst_size, src + 0x10, src_size - 0x10, src, 0x10); + + + if (is_personalized == 0) { + /* Devkit non-personalized keys have no further authentication. */ + return src_size - 0x10; + } + + /* J = GHASH(CTR); */ + uint8_t j_block[0x10]; + ghash(j_block, src, 0x10, NULL, 0); + + /* MAC = GHASH(CTR) ^ ENCRYPT(J) */ + uint8_t calc_mac[0x10]; + ghash(calc_mac, dst, src_size - 0x20, j_block, 1); + + /* Const-time memcmp. */ + int different = 0; + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 0x10; i++) { + different |= src[src_size - 0x10 + i] ^ calc_mac[i]; + } + if (different) { + return 0; + } + + /* TODO: Validate Device ID matches in blob data from fuses. */ + + return src_size - 0x30; +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/exosphere/gcm.h b/exosphere/gcm.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..89fe0e1ed --- /dev/null +++ b/exosphere/gcm.h @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#ifndef EXOSPHERE_GCM_H +#define EXOSPHERE_GCM_H + +#include + +int gcm_decrypt_key(unsigned int keyslot, void *dst, size_t dst_size, const void *src, size_t src_size, const void *sealed_kek, size_t kek_size, const void *wrapped_key, size_t key_size, unsigned int usecase, int is_personalized); + +#endif \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/exosphere/smc_user.c b/exosphere/smc_user.c index 287b5ff87..edc0f379c 100644 --- a/exosphere/smc_user.c +++ b/exosphere/smc_user.c @@ -126,11 +126,11 @@ uint32_t user_generate_aes_kek(smc_args_t *args) { uint64_t is_recovery_boot = configitem_is_recovery_boot(); - /* Mask 2 is only allowed when booted normally. */ + /* Mask 2 is only allowed when booted from recovery. */ if (mask_id == 2 && is_recovery_boot == 0) { return 2; } - /* Mask 1 is only allowed when booted from recovery. */ + /* Mask 1 is only allowed when booted normally. */ if (mask_id == 1 && is_recovery_boot != 0) { return 2; }