diff --git a/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/key_derivation.c b/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/key_derivation.c index bee641f54..f86b7ca0b 100644 --- a/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/key_derivation.c +++ b/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/key_derivation.c @@ -4,8 +4,7 @@ #include "exocfg.h" #include "fuse.h" -static const u8 keyblob_seeds[MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX][0x10] = -{ +static const uint8_t keyblob_seeds[MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX][0x10] = { {0xDF, 0x20, 0x6F, 0x59, 0x44, 0x54, 0xEF, 0xDC, 0x70, 0x74, 0x48, 0x3B, 0x0D, 0xED, 0x9F, 0xD3}, /* Keyblob seed 00. */ {0x0C, 0x25, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x68, 0x4C, 0xEB, 0x42, 0x1C, 0x23, 0x79, 0xEA, 0x82, 0x25, 0x12, 0xAC}, /* Keyblob seed 01. */ {0x33, 0x76, 0x85, 0xEE, 0x88, 0x4A, 0xAE, 0x0A, 0xC2, 0x8A, 0xFD, 0x7D, 0x63, 0xC0, 0x43, 0x3B}, /* Keyblob seed 02. */ @@ -13,111 +12,110 @@ static const u8 keyblob_seeds[MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX][0x10] = {0xBB, 0x5A, 0x01, 0xF9, 0x88, 0xAF, 0xF5, 0xFC, 0x6C, 0xFF, 0x07, 0x9E, 0x13, 0x3C, 0x39, 0x80}, /* Keyblob seed 04. */ }; -static const u8 keyblob_mac_seed[0x10] = -{ +static const uint8_t keyblob_mac_seed[0x10] = { 0x59, 0xC7, 0xFB, 0x6F, 0xBE, 0x9B, 0xBE, 0x87, 0x65, 0x6B, 0x15, 0xC0, 0x53, 0x73, 0x36, 0xA5 }; -static const uint8_t masterkey_seed[0x10] = -{ +static const uint8_t masterkey_seed[0x10] = { 0xD8, 0xA2, 0x41, 0x0A, 0xC6, 0xC5, 0x90, 0x01, 0xC6, 0x1D, 0x6A, 0x26, 0x7C, 0x51, 0x3F, 0x3C }; -static const uint8_t devicekey_seed[0x10] = -{ +static const uint8_t devicekey_seed[0x10] = { 0x4F, 0x02, 0x5F, 0x0E, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xDC, 0x32, 0x7D, 0x41, 0x86, 0xC2, 0xF4, 0x78 }; -static const uint8_t devicekey_4x_seed[0x10] = -{ +static const uint8_t devicekey_4x_seed[0x10] = { 0x0C, 0x91, 0x09, 0xDB, 0x93, 0x93, 0x07, 0x81, 0x07, 0x3C, 0xC4, 0x16, 0x22, 0x7C, 0x6C, 0x28 }; -static const uint8_t masterkey_4x_seed[0x10] = -{ +static const uint8_t masterkey_4x_seed[0x10] = { 0x2D, 0xC1, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0xF3, 0x5B, 0x69, 0x33, 0x42, 0x10, 0xAC, 0x65, 0xDA, 0x90, 0x46, 0x66 }; -void get_tsec_key(void *dst) { +static void get_tsec_key(void *dst, const void *tsec_fw, size_t tsec_fw_size) { /* TODO: Implement this method. Attempt to read TSEC fw from NAND, or from SD if that fails. */ } -void get_keyblob(void *dst, u32 revision) { +void get_keyblob(nx_keyblob_t *dst, uint32_t revision, const nx_keyblob_t *available_keyblobs, uint32_t available_revision) { if (revision >= 0x20) { generic_panic(); } - - /* TODO: Read the appropriate keyblob from eMMC Boot0 partition. */ + + if (revision <= available_revision) { + *dst = available_keyblobs[revision]; + } else { + generic_panic(); + /* TODO: what should we do? */ + } } -bool safe_memcmp(u8 *a, u8 *b, u32 sz) { - u8 different = 0; - for (u32 i = 0; i < sz; i++) { +static bool safe_memcmp(uint8_t *a, uint8_t *b, size_t sz) { + uint8_t different = 0; + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < sz; i++) { different |= a[i] ^ b[i]; } return different != 0; } /* Derive all Switch keys. */ -void derive_nx_keydata(u32 target_firmware) { - u8 work_buffer[0x10]; +void derive_nx_keydata(uint32_t target_firmware, const nx_keyblob_t *available_keyblobs, uint32_t available_revision, const void *tsec_fw, size_t tsec_fw_size) { + uint8_t work_buffer[0x10]; nx_keyblob_t keyblob; - + /* TODO: Set keyslot flags properly in preparation of derivation. */ set_aes_keyslot_flags(0xE, 0x15); set_aes_keyslot_flags(0xD, 0x15); - + /* Set TSEC key. */ - get_tsec_key(work_buffer); + get_tsec_key(work_buffer, tsec_fw, tsec_fw_size); set_aes_keyslot(0xD, work_buffer, 0x10); - - + /* Get keyblob, always try to set up the highest possible master key. */ /* TODO: Should we iterate, trying lower keys on failure? */ - get_keyblob(&keyblob, MASTERKEY_REVISION_500_CURRENT); - + get_keyblob(&keyblob, MASTERKEY_REVISION_500_CURRENT, available_keyblobs, available_revision); + /* Derive both keyblob key 1, and keyblob key latest. */ se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(0xD, work_buffer, 0x10, keyblob_seeds[MASTERKEY_REVISION_100_230], 0x10); decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xF, 0xE, work_buffer, 0x10); se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(0xD, work_buffer, 0x10, keyblob_seeds[MASTERKEY_REVISION_500_CURRENT], 0x10); decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xD, 0xE, work_buffer, 0x10); - + /* Clear the SBK. */ clear_aes_keyslot(0xE); se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(0xD, work_buffer, 0x10, keyblob_mac_seed, 0x10); decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xB, 0xD, keyblob_mac_seed, 0x10); - + /* Validate keyblob. */ se_compute_aes_128_cmac(0xB, work_buffer, 0x10, keyblob.mac + sizeof(keyblob.mac), sizeof(keyblob) - sizeof(keyblob.mac)); if (safe_memcmp(keyblob.mac, work_buffer, 0x10)) { generic_panic(); } - + /* Decrypt keyblob. */ se_aes_ctr_crypt(0xD, keyblob.data, sizeof(keyblob.data), keyblob.data, sizeof(keyblob.data), keyblob.ctr, sizeof(keyblob.ctr)); - + /* Get needed data. */ set_aes_keyslot(0xC, keyblob.keys[0], 0x10); /* We don't need the Package1 Key, but for reference: set_aes_keyslot(0xB, keyblob.keys[8], 0x10); */ - + /* Clear keyblob. */ - memset(keyblob.data, 0, sizeof(keyblob.data)); - + memset(keyblob.data, 0, sizeof(keyblob.data)); + /* Derive keys for Exosphere, lock critical keyslots. */ switch (target_firmware) { case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_100: case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_200: - case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_300: + case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_300: decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xD, 0xF, devicekey_seed, 0x10); decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xC, 0xC, masterkey_seed, 0x10); break; - case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_400: + case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_400: decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xD, 0xF, devicekey_4x_seed, 0x10); decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xF, 0xF, devicekey_seed, 0x10); decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xE, 0xC, masterkey_4x_seed, 0x10); decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xC, 0xC, masterkey_seed, 0x10); break; - case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_500: + case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_500: decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xA, 0xF, devicekey_4x_seed, 0x10); decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xF, 0xF, devicekey_seed, 0x10); decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xE, 0xC, masterkey_4x_seed, 0x10); @@ -126,46 +124,46 @@ void derive_nx_keydata(u32 target_firmware) { default: generic_panic(); } - + /* Setup master key revision, derive older master keys for use. */ mkey_detect_revision(); } /* Sets final keyslot flags, for handover to TZ/Exosphere. Setting these will prevent the BPMP from using the device key or master key. */ -void finalize_nx_keydata(u32 target_firmware) { +void finalize_nx_keydata(uint32_t target_firmware) { set_aes_keyslot_flags(0xC, 0xFF); set_aes_keyslot_flags((target_firmware >= EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_400) ? (KEYSLOT_SWITCH_4XOLDDEVICEKEY) : (KEYSLOT_SWITCH_DEVICEKEY), 0xFF); } -void fusee_generate_specific_aes_key(void *dst, const void *wrapped_key, bool should_mask, u32 target_firmware) { +static void generate_specific_aes_key(void *dst, const void *wrapped_key, bool should_mask, uint32_t target_firmware) { unsigned int keyslot = (target_firmware >= EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_400) ? (KEYSLOT_SWITCH_4XOLDDEVICEKEY) : (KEYSLOT_SWITCH_DEVICEKEY); if (fuse_get_bootrom_patch_version() < 0x7F) { /* On dev units, use a fixed "all-zeroes" seed. */ /* Yes, this data really is all-zero in actual TrustZone .rodata. */ - static const u8 dev_specific_aes_key_source[0x10] = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}; - static const u8 dev_specific_aes_key_ctr[0x10] = {0x3C, 0xD5, 0x92, 0xEC, 0x68, 0x31, 0x4A, 0x06, 0xD4, 0x1B, 0x0C, 0xD9, 0xF6, 0x2E, 0xD9, 0xE9}; - static const u8 dev_specific_aes_key_mask[0x10] = {0xAC, 0xCA, 0x9A, 0xCA, 0xFF, 0x2E, 0xB9, 0x22, 0xCC, 0x1F, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x21, 0x1E}; + static const uint8_t dev_specific_aes_key_source[0x10] = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}; + static const uint8_t dev_specific_aes_key_ctr[0x10] = {0x3C, 0xD5, 0x92, 0xEC, 0x68, 0x31, 0x4A, 0x06, 0xD4, 0x1B, 0x0C, 0xD9, 0xF6, 0x2E, 0xD9, 0xE9}; + static const uint8_t dev_specific_aes_key_mask[0x10] = {0xAC, 0xCA, 0x9A, 0xCA, 0xFF, 0x2E, 0xB9, 0x22, 0xCC, 0x1F, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x21, 0x1E}; se_aes_ctr_crypt(keyslot, dst, 0x10, dev_specific_aes_key_source, 0x10, dev_specific_aes_key_ctr, 0x10); if (should_mask) { for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 0x10; i++) { - ((u8 *)dst)[i] ^= dev_specific_aes_key_mask[i]; + ((uint8_t *)dst)[i] ^= dev_specific_aes_key_mask[i]; } } } else { /* On retail, standard kek->key decryption. */ - static const u8 retail_specific_aes_key_source[0x10] = {0xE2, 0xD6, 0xB8, 0x7A, 0x11, 0x9C, 0xB8, 0x80, 0xE8, 0x22, 0x88, 0x8A, 0x46, 0xFB, 0xA1, 0x95}; + static const uint8_t retail_specific_aes_key_source[0x10] = {0xE2, 0xD6, 0xB8, 0x7A, 0x11, 0x9C, 0xB8, 0x80, 0xE8, 0x22, 0x88, 0x8A, 0x46, 0xFB, 0xA1, 0x95}; decrypt_data_into_keyslot(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, keyslot, retail_specific_aes_key_source, 0x10); se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, dst, 0x10, wrapped_key, 0x10); } } -void fusee_generate_personalized_aes_key_for_bis(void *dst, const void *wrapped_kek, const void *wrapped_key, u32 target_firmware) { - static const u8 kek_source[0x10] = { +static void generate_personalized_aes_key_for_bis(void *dst, const void *wrapped_kek, const void *wrapped_key, uint32_t target_firmware) { + static const uint8_t kek_source[0x10] = { 0x4D, 0x87, 0x09, 0x86, 0xC4, 0x5D, 0x20, 0x72, 0x2F, 0xBA, 0x10, 0x53, 0xDA, 0x92, 0xE8, 0xA9 }; - static const u8 key_source[0x10] = { + static const uint8_t key_source[0x10] = { 0x89, 0x61, 0x5E, 0xE0, 0x5C, 0x31, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x5F, 0xE5, 0x8F, 0x3D, 0xA2, 0x4F, 0x7A, 0xA8 }; @@ -178,8 +176,8 @@ void fusee_generate_personalized_aes_key_for_bis(void *dst, const void *wrapped_ se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, dst, 0x10, wrapped_key, 0x10); } -void derive_bis_key(void *dst, BisPartition_t partition_id, u32 target_firmware) { - static const u8 key_source_for_bis[3][2][0x10] = { +void derive_bis_key(void *dst, BisPartition partition_id, uint32_t target_firmware) { + static const uint8_t key_source_for_bis[3][2][0x10] = { { {0xF8, 0x3F, 0x38, 0x6E, 0x2C, 0xD2, 0xCA, 0x32, 0xA8, 0x9A, 0xB9, 0xAA, 0x29, 0xBF, 0xC7, 0x48}, {0x7D, 0x92, 0xB0, 0x3A, 0xA8, 0xBF, 0xDE, 0xE1, 0xA7, 0x4C, 0x3B, 0x6E, 0x35, 0xCB, 0x71, 0x06} @@ -193,19 +191,19 @@ void derive_bis_key(void *dst, BisPartition_t partition_id, u32 target_firmware) {0x4D, 0x12, 0xE1, 0x4B, 0x2A, 0x47, 0x4C, 0x1C, 0x09, 0xCB, 0x03, 0x59, 0xF0, 0x15, 0xF4, 0xE4} } }; - - static const u8 bis_kek_source[0x10] = {0x34, 0xC1, 0xA0, 0xC4, 0x82, 0x58, 0xF8, 0xB4, 0xFA, 0x9E, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xFC, 0x7E, 0x4F}; + + static const uint8_t bis_kek_source[0x10] = {0x34, 0xC1, 0xA0, 0xC4, 0x82, 0x58, 0xF8, 0xB4, 0xFA, 0x9E, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xFC, 0x7E, 0x4F}; switch (partition_id) { case BisPartition_Calibration: - fusee_generate_specific_aes_key(dst, key_source_for_bis[partition_id][0], false, target_firmware); - fusee_generate_specific_aes_key(dst + 0x10, key_source_for_bis[partition_id][1], false, target_firmware); + generate_specific_aes_key(dst, key_source_for_bis[partition_id][0], false, target_firmware); + generate_specific_aes_key(dst + 0x10, key_source_for_bis[partition_id][1], false, target_firmware); break; case BisPartition_Safe: case BisPartition_UserSystem: - fusee_generate_personalized_aes_key_for_bis(dst, bis_kek_source, key_source_for_bis[partition_id][0], target_firmware); - fusee_generate_personalized_aes_key_for_bis(dst + 0x10, bis_kek_source, key_source_for_bis[partition_id][1], target_firmware); + generate_personalized_aes_key_for_bis(dst, bis_kek_source, key_source_for_bis[partition_id][0], target_firmware); + generate_personalized_aes_key_for_bis(dst + 0x10, bis_kek_source, key_source_for_bis[partition_id][1], target_firmware); break; default: generic_panic(); } -} \ No newline at end of file +} diff --git a/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/key_derivation.h b/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/key_derivation.h index ddbc9f4c3..bfc7c6a69 100644 --- a/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/key_derivation.h +++ b/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/key_derivation.h @@ -1,7 +1,9 @@ #ifndef FUSEE_KEYDERIVATION_H #define FUSEE_KEYDERIVATION_H -#include "hwinit/tsec.h" +#include +#include +#include /* TODO: Update to 0x6 on release of new master key. */ #define MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX 0x5 @@ -14,24 +16,24 @@ #define MASTERKEY_NUM_NEW_DEVICE_KEYS (MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX - MASTERKEY_REVISION_400_410) -typedef enum { +typedef enum BisPartition { BisPartition_Calibration = 0, BisPartition_Safe = 1, - BisPartition_UserSystem = 2 -} BisPartition_t; + BisPartition_UserSystem = 2, +} BisPartition; -typedef struct { - u8 mac[0x10]; - u8 ctr[0x10]; +typedef struct nx_keyblob_t { + uint8_t mac[0x10]; + uint8_t ctr[0x10]; union { - u8 data[0x90]; - u8 keys[9][0x10]; + uint8_t data[0x90]; + uint8_t keys[9][0x10]; }; } nx_keyblob_t; -void derive_nx_keydata(u32 target_firmware); -void finalize_nx_keydata(u32 target_firmware); +void derive_nx_keydata(uint32_t target_firmware, const nx_keyblob_t *available_keyblobs, uint32_t available_revision, const void *tsec_fw, size_t tsec_fw_size); +void finalize_nx_keydata(uint32_t target_firmware); -void derive_bis_key(void *dst, BisPartition_t partition_id, u32 target_firmware); +void derive_bis_key(void *dst, BisPartition partition_id, uint32_t target_firmware); -#endif \ No newline at end of file +#endif diff --git a/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/nxboot.c b/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/nxboot.c index 0b200abe9..10d4d811b 100644 --- a/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/nxboot.c +++ b/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/nxboot.c @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ void nxboot_main(void) { nxboot_configure_exosphere(); /* Derive keydata. */ - derive_nx_keydata(MAILBOX_EXOSPHERE_CONFIGURATION->target_firmware); + //derive_nx_keydata(MAILBOX_EXOSPHERE_CONFIGURATION->target_firmware); if (loader_ctx->package2_loadfile.load_address == 0) { if (init_bcpkg2_device() == -1) { diff --git a/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/package1.c b/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/package1.c index 44e7c5dbb..ae644ba0c 100644 --- a/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/package1.c +++ b/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/package1.c @@ -3,13 +3,13 @@ #include "package1.h" #include "bct.h" -int package1_parse_boot0(void **package1, size_t *package1_size, nx_keyblob_t *keyblobs, uint32_t *version, FILE *boot0) { +int package1_parse_boot0(void **package1, size_t *package1_size, nx_keyblob_t *keyblobs, uint32_t *revision, FILE *boot0) { static nvboot_config_table bct = {0}; /* Normal firmware BCT, primary. TODO: check? */ nv_bootloader_info *pk1_info = &bct.bootloader[0]; /* TODO: check? */ size_t fpos, pk1_offset; - if (package1 == NULL || package1_size != NULL || keyblobs == NULL || version == NULL || boot0 == NULL) { + if (package1 == NULL || package1_size != NULL || keyblobs == NULL || revision == NULL || boot0 == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ int package1_parse_boot0(void **package1, size_t *package1_size, nx_keyblob_t *k return -1; } - *version = pk1_info->attribute; + *revision = pk1_info->attribute; *package1_size = pk1_info->length; pk1_offset = 0x4000 * pk1_info->start_blk + 0x200 * pk1_info->start_page; diff --git a/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/package1.h b/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/package1.h index cdd18183c..fe9f92e4c 100644 --- a/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/package1.h +++ b/fusee/fusee-secondary/src/package1.h @@ -4,6 +4,6 @@ #include #include "key_derivation.h" -int package1_parse_boot0(void **package1, size_t *package1_size, nx_keyblob_t *keyblobs, uint32_t *version, FILE *boot0); +int package1_parse_boot0(void **package1, size_t *package1_size, nx_keyblob_t *keyblobs, uint32_t *revision, FILE *boot0); #endif